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Map of Mali 
 
Map of Mali and surroundings that also depicts the main areas in the region populated by the 
Tuareg and the part of northern Mali that was claimed by the insurgents at the highlight of 
the crisis in January 2013.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 “Sahara Tuareg Tribes Inspired By Al Qaeda Attack EU Oil Station In Algeria,” Culture of Life News, January 17, 
2013, accessed June 13, 2017, https://emsnews.wordpress.com/2013/01/17/sahara-tuareg-tribes-inspired-by-
al-qaeda-attack-eu-oil-station-in-algeria/.  
4 
 
1. Introduction  
On January 26, 2013, French forces moved into the northern Malian city of Gao. The capture 
of this city was the result of a swift march up north from the government-controlled south of 
the country.2 This government had asked for help from both France and the UN after Islamists 
had quickly taken control over the extensive northern part of the country that had been ruled 
by Tuareg insurgents since January 2012.3 The call for aid first led to a French intervention in 
Mali. The international community followed later in the form of a UN-led peacekeeping 
mission and strong EU involvement in several forms. Since then, actors such as the UN and 
the EU have been attempting to stimulate the (re)development of Mali. However, despite the 
large international presence in the country, Mali remains a generally unsafe, underdeveloped, 
and divided state. 
This problematic situation poses some questions that are worth looking at. One that 
quickly comes to mind regards the direct effectiveness of these peacebuilding policies. 
However, one will also have to look deeper into structural causes. For instance, is the Western 
state building model really useful and applicable to Mali? And what exactly are the interests 
of the EU in Mali, except for its normative goal of aiding a suffering population in a war-torn 
area? These are questions that will most likely rise while reading this introductory chapter, 
which reviews the events of the past four years, and will try to discuss some of the main 
complications in the external state building efforts. The chapter will conclude by providing 
the main research question and several hypotheses to provide guidance in the performance of 
this research. 
1.1 Short History of Mali’s Tuareg Insurgency 
While Mali has been through a turbulent history, inter-regional trade always has been one of 
the defining factors of the country, and still makes it a crossroads of current smuggling routes. 
The history of Mali as an entity dates back to the 14th or 15th century, when several of its 
cities, such as Goa and Timbuktu, flourished as a result of trans-Saharan trade.4 Trade was 
also a key reason for France to colonialize the area between the Senegal and Niger rivers from 
                                                          
2 “Mali: French-led soldiers ‘in control of Gao,’” BBC News, January 26, 2013, accessed April 4, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21210496.  
3 Adam Nossiter, “Mali Government is Left Reeling After Islamists Take Village Long Held by Army,” The New 
York Times, January 10,2013, accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/world/africa/islamists-take-mali-village-forcing-army-into-retreat.html.  
4 “Over Mali,” Nederlandse Ambassade Bamako, accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://mali.nlambassade.org/you-and-country/over-mali.html. 
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the late 19th century onwards. In 1959, Mali and Senegal merged into a single state, which 
became independent in 1960. However, only two months later Senegal separated again from 
this combination. This independence was followed by a period of dictatorship in Mali, which 
was first led by a Marxist regime and after 1968 by the new president Moussa Traoré.5 A 
coup d’état in 1991 meant the rise of democracy in Mali. After the ousting of president 
Traoré, free elections took place in 1992. After this moment, Mali became a democratic state 
for the following 20 years.  
However, the failure to solve certain issues has most likely resulted in a feeling of 
neglect and frustration among the Northern Malians vis-à-vis the rest of the state. The state’s 
institutions remained weak throughout time, especially in the thinly populated northern part 
(about 90% of the total population lives in the south).6,7 Probably with this in mind, the 
Malian government increasingly turned to largely ethnic minorities after the Tuareg rebellion 
of 2006 as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.8 In exchange for loyalty of these groups, the 
central government quietly allowed the drug-trade in this part of the country to continue. This 
resulted in increasing competition between the different factions. The already dominant tribal 
culture was thus strengthened by political factors in an economic environment that is both 
highly unequal and corrupt and lacks opportunities for young people. This combination seems 
to have resulted in a strong loyalty towards tribal groups, other insurgent movements, and 
organized criminal groups, and a large amount of dissatisfaction with regard to the 
government in Bamako.9 Lastly, the return of many Tuareg fighters and weapons back to Mali 
after chaos broke out in Libya seems to have been a final factor that made an insurgency in 
the North inevitable.10,11 
The frustrations reached a boiling point during the course of 2012. After Tuareg rebel 
forces (commonly known as the MNLA) swiftly took over a large part of the North in early 
                                                          
5 Ibid.  
6 “MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali”, UN.org, accessed 
February 14, 2017, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.  
7 “Factsheet: Mali in feiten en cijfers: MINUSMA,” Ministerie van Defensie, accessed February 14, 2017, 
file://vuw/Personal$/Homes/18/s1855921/Downloads/Mali+in+feiten+en+cijfers.pdf. 
8 Andrew Lebovich, “The risks of deeper engagement in Mali,” European Council on Foreign Relations, August 3, 
2016, accessed March 30, 2017, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_risks_of_deeper_engagement_in_mali_7089.  
9 “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,” European Union External Action Service, September 
2016, 3.  
10 “Veiligheid en stabiliteit,” 9.  
11 Bart Schuurman and Sergei Boeke, “Operation Serval: the French Intervention in Mali,” Leiden Safety and 
Security Blog, July 28, 2015, accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/operation-serval-the-french-intervention-in-mali. 
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2012, frustrated soldiers ousted president Touré through a coup d’état on March 22, 2012.12 
To add up to these events, months after the coup tensions between the different rebel groups 
in the north quickly escalated. By the end of the year, radical Islamist groups such as Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had taken over most of the rebel-held territory.13    
1.2 Operation Serval 
The first weeks of 2013 did not bring improvement for the Malian government. After more 
serious losses and a swift march South by the Islamist factions (mainly Ansar Dine and the 
Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, supported by AQIM), the government 
officially requested assistance of both France and the wider international community.14 France 
responded quickly, and on January 11, 2013 the first French troops and material took part in 
military operations on Malian soil under the banner of “Opération Serval.”15 
A successful recapturing of most of the territory could not solve the many structural 
issues that still needed to be addressed though. The offensive was quite efficient in the sense 
that most of the country’s major population centers had become subject to government control 
again by the end of January. 16  However, many insurgents managed to flee to the thinly 
populated mountains and deserts in the north, from where terrorist attacks and smuggling 
nowadays still continue. 17  At a deeper level, it seems nearly impossible to address the 
structural inequality between the Northern regions and the rest of the country through a 
narrow focus on security. For some, this focus actually seems to have contributed to the issues 
that led to the 2012 situation in the first place.18 The limitations of short-term interventions in 
addressing long-term challenges are also discussed in a Leiden Safety and Security Blog, 
which concludes that “Serval’s long-term legacy remains unclear.” 19  However, several 
longer-term peacebuilding missions are currently present in Mali, two of which will be 
                                                          
12 “MINUSMA: United Nations,” accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.  
13 “Over Mali,” accessed February 14, 2017, http://mali.nlambassade.org/you-and-country/over-mali.html.  
14 “MINUSMA: United Nations,” accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, “The roots of Mali’s conflict,” Clingendael, March 2015, accessed 
February 14, 2017, 
https://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/3_a_playing_field_for_foreign_powers/.  
19 Schuurman and Boeke, “Operation Serval,” accessed February 14, 2017, 
http://www.leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/operation-serval-the-french-intervention-in-mali.  
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discussed more extensively here: the UN’s operation MINUSMA and the EU’s various ways 
of involvement.   
1.3 Operation MINUSMA 
The most extensive mission that was set up by the international community in Mali in recent 
years is known as MINUSMA. This UN-led operation in Mali came into existence after UN 
Security Council Resolution 2100 of April 25, 2013 cleared the way for more far-reaching 
peace enforcement in this country. This decision resulted in the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).20  The operation, 
whose main goals are to “support the political process and carry out a number of security-
related stabilization tasks,”21 initially got a mandate of twelve months. This has later on been 
extended various times.22 MINUSMA now mentions eight general targets it strives to achieve, 
which include the stabilization of the most important population centers and the expansion of 
the national government’s control, the support for the implementation of a transition plan of 
the national government, and the protection of the population and the UN personnel.23  
The mission of about 13,000 soldiers is made up and supported by a diverse range of 
actors. Several European states have joined the mission for seemingly various reasons, next to 
the normative aspect of solidarity with a hard-hit civil population. First, international stability 
seems to have been an important consideration. This mainly has to do with the rise of Islamic 
terrorism. That is, much of the success of the 2012 insurgency was hijacked by extremist 
Islamic groups. Halting the rise of the Islamists therefore seems to have been an important 
consideration for both countries in the region struggling with similar problems and states in 
other parts of the world that are also dealing with Islamic terrorism.24 However, in the longer 
run and connected to the stability aspect, control over the migration and smuggling routes is 
another important consideration for many (European) states. After all, Mali stands at a 
crossroads of these routes within the fragile and hard to control Sahel region.25 For instance, 
                                                          
20 “MINUSMA: United Nations,” accessed February 19, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 “Factsheet: Mali,” accessed March 30, 2017, 
file://vuw/Personal$/Homes/18/s1855921/Downloads/Mali+in+feiten+en+cijfers.pdf. 
24 Jude Cocodia and Fidelis Paki, “Achieving Stability in African Conflicts: The Role of Contingent Size and Force 
Integrity,” African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 6 (1), Spring 2016, 57. 
25 “Voortgangsrapportage MINUSMA,” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, letter addressing the Dutch 
Parliament (Tweede Kamer), December 18, 2015, 15. 
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the Netherlands sees stability around Europe, migration, and terrorism as important reasons 
for participating in UN peacebuilding operations.26  
Since 2015, the difficult implementation of the peace deal between the national 
government and the rebel factions has become one of the most important concrete goals of the 
mission. This deal included plans for the development of the north and improvement of the 
rule of law.27 MINUSMA is contributing as one of the actors included in the Comité de Suivi 
de l’accord de Paix (CSA), the committee responsible for monitoring the progress of this 
deal.28 Some positive developments took place here, such as the appointment of local councils 
that will focus on eventual new elections.29 On the other hand, continuing conflicts between 
different rebel groups, a precarious humanitarian situation in the North, and a lack of state 
control in some of the northern parts of Mali (still no return of the Malian army to some parts 
of the North) present structural problems that seem hard to solve.30 These results then present 
a very mixed picture of the peace process, which seems to increasingly suffer from a lack of 
progress.  
One of the key criticisms regarding this difficult implementation of the peace deal 
concerns the lack of regional expertise involved. After all, the African Union has for a long 
time been involved in a very limited way. This was despite the fact that it most likely has 
plenty of useful expertise concerning the local situation (it is now becoming increasingly 
active in Mali). For example, the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) also 
includes several conflict resolution mechanisms that the AU could potentially make use of.31 
The resulting Western-based top-down approach might also have contributed to the problems 
in establishing a functioning governance system in Mali.32 This is a criticism to be taken into 
account when looking at another important actor in the peacebuilding process, namely the EU, 
and the problems encountered during this process.  
 
 
                                                          
26 “Achtergrond Mali,” Ministerie van Defensie, accessed March 30, 2017, 
https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/missie-in-mali/inhoud/achtergrond-mali. 
27 “Voortgangsrapportage MINUSMA,” December 18, 2015, 3. 
28 Ibid. 
29 “Verlenging Nederlandse bijdrage MINUSMA,” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, letter addressing the 
Dutch Parliament (Tweede Kamer), October 7, 2016, 5. 
30 Ibid, 6. 
31 Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, “The African Union and the Conflict in Mali: Extra-Regional Influence and the 
Limitations of a Regional Actor,” Journal of International and Global Studies 6 (1), November 2014, 106-107. 
32 Ibid. 
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1.4 The European Union’s Presence in Mali 
The European Union is an interesting organization to study in this case for several 
reasons. First, it will be greatly impacted by developments in the Sahel, such as migration, 
smuggling, and terrorism. In particular, population growth and the predicted migration 
streams, and the direct security threat posed by AQIM are core reasons for EU member states 
to become active in Mali.3334 Furthermore, the Union has recently been trying to develop 
more autonomy in the fields of foreign policy and security, which might be turned into 
practice in the case of Mali.35 Last, the EU generally presents itself as a normative power that 
combines democratic with economic development, and in this way tries to create a 
functioning state in Mali that confirms to the Western model.36 At the same time, it is engaged 
in the controversial EU-Turkey deal, and will possibly try to achieve similar migration-related 
agreements with other states. This can for example be seen in the case of the recently 
expanded support to the region with 2 billion euros, which in the future might be dependent 
upon the receiving governments’ cooperation in curbing migration.37  
The EU’s state building effort in Mali mainly takes place through two missions in the 
security and defense sphere, namely the European Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali and the 
European Union CSDP Mission in Mali (EUCAP Mali). EUCAP has been active since 
January 2015, and mainly focuses on aiding the police, gendarmerie, and national guard of 
Mali.38  Other EUCAP missions, in particular the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission, also pay 
specific attention to supporting the authorities in the prevention of migration and human 
trafficking. This focus on migration-related issues might also become more prominent in the 
case of EUCAP Mali in the recent future.39  
EUTM Mali is older and has a more general mandate. This mission was established in 
February 2013, shortly after the French intervention.40 The relatively quick establishment is 
the result of successful international lobbying efforts from the side of France during the 
                                                          
33 “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, 4. 
34 “Verlenging Nederlandse bijdrage,” October 7, 2016, 4. 
35 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” European Union Global Strategy, June 2016, 4-5.  
36 “Mali and the EU,“ Delegation of the European Union to Mali, May 12, 2016, accessed March 31, 2017,  
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/11062/node/11062_en.  
37 Reuters, “To curb Migration,” accessed February 11, 2017, http://www.voanews.com/a/to-curb-migration-
eu-must-solve-sahel-population-boom-un-says/3530678.html.  
38 “Mali and the EU,“ accessed March 31, 2017, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/11062/node/11062_en.  
39 “Voortgangsrapportage MINUSMA,” December 18, 2015, 16. 
40 “Mali and the EU,”  accessed March 31, 2017, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/11062/node/11062_en. 
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course of 2012. This concretely led to UNSC resolutions that laid down the legal framework 
for the French intervention. Yet indirectly the emphasis on the problems in Mali has probably 
enhanced the establishment of EUTM in an early stage as well.41 Furthermore, the mandate of 
this mission is quite broad, namely to train and support the Malian security services in order 
to strengthen their performance. 42  In that sense, it might complement MINUSMA in an 
interesting way. 
Next to these two missions, the EU also provides economic and development 
assistance. These forms of aid are mainly focused on “political and economic governance, 
strengthening institutional capacities and regional integration.”43 In practice, this broad focus 
entails a diversity of activities ranging from ECHO’s execution of a humanitarian action plan 
for Mali or development investments by the European Development Fund (EDF) to an EU 
Trust Fund that focuses on migration and improved regional security cooperation.44,45 
Thus, the EU has specific interests in the region, and a clear presence in Mali as a 
result. It simply cannot ignore the events in Mali, even if it wanted to. Given the 
interrelatedness between current security or migration issues in Mali or the broader Sahel 
region and their probable implications for the European continent, not intervening could prove 
a costly choice in the future. In this approach, cooperation with the UN missions and regional 
organizations such as the African Union (AU) seem logical options that are also outlined in 
the EU’s external strategy for the region.46 However, the efficiency of the current policies are 
subject to debate as well. After all, both the UN and EU missions in Mali have been going on 
for several years, yet show little signs of real progress. All in all, this approach is therefore 
subject to the same scrutiny as the UN-led mission; one could for example once again doubt 
the usefulness of establishing Western-based institutions in the tribal Malian culture. 
1.5 Core Complications & Broader Implications  
This seeming lack of progress despite the high stakes makes one wonder what the 
main complications at the moment are. After all, more stability in Mali and the broader region 
seem to be in almost all international actors’ interests. Many of them, including Western 
                                                          
41 Schuurman and Boeke, “Operation Serval,” accessed April 3, 2017, 
http://www.leidensafetyandsecurityblog.nl/articles/operation-serval-the-french-intervention-in-mali. 
42 “Factsheet: Mali,” accessed April 3, 2017, 
file://vuw/Personal$/Homes/18/s1855921/Downloads/Mali+in+feiten+en+cijfers.pdf. 
43 “Mali and the EU,” accessed April 3, 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/11062/node/11062_en. 
44 Voortgangsrapportage MINUSMA,” December 18, 2015, 8. 
45 “Verlenging Nederlandse bijdrage,” October 7, 2016, 8. 
46 “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, 4-6. 
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states, have also invested large amounts of money in both peacekeeping operations and the 
broader developmental approach. However, while these changes can naturally not take place 
within one or two years, the state’s stability seems to have deteriorated compared to last 
year.47 This setback yields the question whether specific complications can be identified that 
have mainly influenced this relative lack of progress.   
The main problem appears to be the continuing insecurity and lack of governmental 
influence in the North. On a positive note, a peace deal that involved more autonomy for the 
Northern regions was reached in June 2015. 48  However, the continuing fights between 
splintered rebel groups, the limited authority of both MINUSMA and the Malian government 
in parts of the North due to a lack of progress in the implementation of the peace accord, and 
the persistent threat of Islamic movements still form major concerns for the very fragile 
security situation.49 This unstable situation also hinders organizations such as USAID from 
properly implementing or assessing their programs; this same complication most likely 
applies to the EU as well.50 
This problem might have to do with more structural issues though. Namely, the state 
of Mali has never truly had authority in large swaths of its territory before the conflict of 2012 
either.51 The geography and tribal culture always seem to have prevented a state functioning 
along Western lines. Furthermore, the responsible officials have for a long time mainly been 
serving their own interests through corrupt and extractive institutions.52 While most Western 
government reports address the need to stimulate good governance, the emphasis on this 
factor normally takes place mainly along Western lines as well, without taking the local 
context into account.53 This largely top-down approach of external actors is unlikely to be 
successful if the local needs and desires are not more specifically addressed.54 This claim is 
supported in an article by Lebovich, who stresses the difficulty of establishing a stable 
Western-based state system in Sahel countries because of the tribal culture and the income-
dependency of these groups on sources such as long-distance drug-trading.55 One can witness 
                                                          
47“Mali in 2016,” Fund for Peace, accessed April 4, 2017,  http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/2016-mali.  
48 “Veiligheid en stabiliteit,” 10. 
49 “Verlenging Nederlandse bijdrage,” October 7, 2016, 3. 
50 “Mali: Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2015-2020,” USAID, 18. 
51 “MINUSMA: United Nations,” accessed April 4, 2017, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background. 
52 Oluwadare, “The African Union and the Conflict in Mali,” 112. 
53 “Mali: Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2015-2020,” 17-18. 
54 Lebovic, “The risks of deeper engagement in Mali,” accessed April 4, 2017, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_risks_of_deeper_engagement_in_mali_7089. 
55 Ibid.  
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the same problem in many other state building approaches where a true change of mindset 
among institutions and the elite is not achieved, such as South Sudan or Afghanistan.56  
All in all, despite the presence of several international missions, one can thus witness a 
lack of improvement with regard to the security and economic situations in Mali. While a 
large amount of resources has been spent on the solvation of these problems during the last 
few years, the developments in Mali are still a cause for concern. 
1.6 Research Question & Hypotheses 
In short, the goal of this research will thus be to gain more insight into the situation in 
Mali and the European Union’s presence in this state. Yet these results can hopefully 
contribute to the establishment of a conclusion as regards the extent to which the institutional 
theory as will be discussed in the next chapter holds in the case of the Sahel region, and in 
that way also present new findings in the broader field of state building. In order to achieve 
these results, the research will focus on the following main question:  
To what extent does the EU state building policy fit with the local situation in Mali?  
Hereby the term “EU state building policy” mainly refers to an overarching framework of two 
official EU missions in Mali (EUTM and EUCAP Mali), and the Union’s economic and 
developmental policy with respect to this country. While these are quite different fields to 
focus on, this approach seems justified as it is the Union itself that focuses on a combination 
of these aspects in its regional strategy. After all, the EU’s External Action Service (EEAS) 
seems to strive to combine the security, economic, and development fields for third states into 
overarching policies, in order to tackle the strongly interdependent problems of security and 
development.57  
The “local situation in Mali” might also appear to be a broad term that is hard to 
pinpoint on a particular aspect. This is certainly true. Yet in this research, the term will mainly 
refer to the complex political situation, in which the central government appears to have lost 
effective control over a large part of its territory due to several factors, not least of all the 
particular northern Malian culture with its focus on informal institutions such as tribes. 
Three main hypotheses underlie the expected answer to the main research question. 
First of all, a lack of consultation of the local population has probably contributed to a failure 
to establish inclusive institutions, and therefore to a sense of neglect among specific groups of 
                                                          
56 “Conquering chaos: Fixing fragile nations,” The Economist, January 7, 2017, 44-45. 
57 “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel,” 1-2.  
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the Malian population. Second, the specific circumstances of Mali and the broader Sahel 
region, such as culture, geographical situation, and trade relations, do most likely form a large 
barrier to the establishment of a Western state model. These two expectations are based upon 
the difficulty that external actors have to establish better functioning institutions without 
properly changing the nature of these institutions as outlined in chapter two. And last, the 
European Union’s external policy for Mali is largely based upon the desire to reduce 
migration numbers to Europe, and not solely upon the idea of creating a sustainable and 
functioning state. This expectation is mainly derived from introductory research into the EU’s 
internal and external policies with regards to the Sahel region. The reasons driving this EU 
policy will be more thoroughly investigated in chapter five. 
A specific focus on the state building attempts by external actors, such as the EU, in 
Mali seems interesting for several reasons. First, this case is quite representative for the 
broader Sahel region. One could argue here that the Tuareg issue is specific to Mali.58 
However, the problems related to unemployment, migration, and terrorism in the context of 
the tribal culture can be found in the entire region, and will have strong implications for 
Europe no matter their origin. 59  One could for instance think of the predicted rise in 
population growth: with an average age of 16.2 years old at the moment, the total population 
is expected to double by 2035.60,61 Given the fact that migration from Islamic states has for a 
long time been an issue in Europe already, the predicted new surge of migrants from this 
region seems likely to lead to more controversy in the future.62  
Furthermore, more clarity about the process that led the EU and its member states to 
become involved in Mali might also provide interesting insights that apply to similar cases in 
the future. Given the many implications that this region’s problems might have for the EU’s 
stability, it is important to analyze efforts to stabilize one of these states. After all, the threat 
of terrorism, and the quick demographic changes that are connected to the increase in 
migration numbers are now high on the political agenda in EU states. The desire for deals 
with countries in this region similar to the one reached with Turkey also seems to be 
                                                          
58 Ole Martin Gaasholt, “Who needs to reconcile with whom? The Conflict’s Complexity in Northern Mali Calls 
for Tailored Solutions,” The Nordic Africa Institute, 2015, 1.  
59 “Veiligheid en stabiliteit in Noordelijk Afrika,” Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (101), May 2016, 8, 
21.  
60 “Human Development Reports: Mali,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed April 22, 2017, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MLI.  
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rising.63,64,65 Therefore, it is not only important to understand the underlying problems, but 
also the reasoning of Western states in this case. Understanding this process could be helpful 
for the prediction of outcomes in future Western state building attempts, and can contribute to 
the discussion about the actual effectiveness of peacebuilding attempts by external actors in 
the management of these conflicts. 66 
Finally, the changing role of global actors poses questions about the EU’s ability to act 
in a coherent way in external crises. After all, the US has become increasingly wary to 
intervene in other conflicts across the world, many of which directly affect Europe. 67 With 
the EU trying to develop a more autonomous external action strategy as a result, Mali presents 
a good case to look deeper into the functioning of the external institutions of the EU, and what 
this could entail for future missions and cooperation with other regional and international 
actors, such as the African Union (AU) or the UN. 
Now that the general context and main goals of this research are clear, the next chapter 
will first of all discuss the theoretical framework that could provide guidance in the analysis 
of this problem. The two chapters after that will dive deeper into the different circumstances 
that led up to the current crisis in Mali, and the developments concerning the EU’s state 
building approach in Mali that took place in recent years. This in combination with the 
theoretical framework should provide a good background for the overall analysis of the 
usefulness of this approach toward state building. 
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2. Theoretical Framework & Methodology 
Before moving on to the research regarding the problems in Mali and the connected EU 
policy addressing these issues, one will first need to be aware of the theoretical framework 
within the guidance of which this research will take place, as well as of the methodology 
through which the research will actually be performed. These crucial factors will be outlined 
in this chapter, starting with an overview of the most important theoretical contributions in 
this field and their usefulness for the purpose of this research.  
2.1 Overview of Different Theoretical Works 
2.1.1 Mahoney and the Essence of Path Dependence 
The first aspect to discuss here is the core idea of “path dependence.” In essence, path 
dependence is present when “early contingent events set cases on an historical trajectory of 
change that diverges from theoretical expectations.” 68  Or in other words, “that what has 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a later point in time.”69 Thus, certain events of which the effects are at that time 
still unknown, will throughout time lead to a certain path of no return, eventually causing an 
outcome that was still unknown during the initial phases.  
Path dependent analyses have three defining features, according to Mahoney. First, the 
processes that they focus on are highly sensitive to events that take place in the early phases 
of an overall historical sequence. Second, early historical events are quite contingent, meaning 
that they are connected to, but not solely formed by previous events in the “path”. Last, 
however, once these contingent historical events have taken place, path dependent sequences 
can be seen as largely deterministic. This basically entails that, although only partially 
connected to the previous events, these new factors all contribute to a chain of circumstances 
that eventually make a particular outcome inevitable.70 
Within this concept of path dependence, one can distinguish two different types of 
sequences or chains. The first one is known as the self-reinforcing sequence. This type of 
sequence is set in motion by initial steps in a certain direction that throughout time make a 
reversal to another direction more and more difficult, until it is very unlikely to take place.71 
The idea of “increasing returns” plays a large role in this development: the continued adoption 
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of a certain path will yield increasing benefits. This in turn makes it less likely over time that 
an alternative would be selected, since this will cost more and more money as time passes 
by.72  While this (utilitarian) approach has for a long time mainly focused on the economic 
level, it can essentially also explain the persistence of less functional institutions.73 This might 
be exemplified in Mali by the fact that elites kept the colonial system in place after 
independence, as this provided them with more liberty to do as they pleased than a system that 
would fit the local situation better.74 
The second type of causal relationship is known as the reactive sequence. The core 
aspect of this chain can be found in the assumption that each step is causally connected to and 
dependent upon prior events. In this way, the overall chain of events can be seen as a more 
direct path leading up to the final outcome under investigation. The distinction between this 
chain and the self-reinforcing sequence is mainly found in the fact that events are clearly 
reactive to each other, following a specifically path dependent trajectory, as opposed to the 
more straightforward idea of causally connected factors as put forward in the in the idea of 
self-reinforcing sequences.75 In this sequence, the contingency of early events is emphasized: 
“a small change in one of these events can accumulate over time and make a great deal of 
difference by the end of the sequence.” 76  Critical junctures form a crucial aspect here: 
different sequences interact at some point, leading up to a subsequent shared chain of events, 
whereby the moment when these sequences “intersect” is determines what will happen next.77 
Looking at the case of Mali through this angle, one could find moments when main policy 
decisions were taken as examples of this type of sequence.  
When comparing the two types, the concept of the self-reinforcing sequence appears to 
be the more suitable option in this case. After all, in the serious yet largely unnoticeable 
gradual development of the path toward the escalation in 2012/2013, one can mainly 
recognize the succession of events that all added up to the point in which the situation 
escalated in 2012. Naturally, certain reactive choices have added to the situation, such as the 
government’s decision to decentralize its services, or the military coup in 2013. However, 
many different factors had already largely limited the choices to be made, such as the tribal 
culture and the importance of the informal sector in northern Mali. It therefore seems likely 
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that circumstantial and institutional factors have largely set out the course of history in this 
case, while reactive events and choices have been of more short-term influence, meaning the 
final blow to the institutional stability of Mali.  
2.1.2 Institutional Theory by Acemoglu and Robinson 
Now that the core issues concerning path dependence are clear, two main theories will be 
discussed that actually integrate this concept into the framework of institutional theory, albeit 
in different manners. The first of these theoretical frameworks is derived from Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. In their bestseller Why Nations Fail, these two authors 
outline a core theory as to why certain nations have become stable and prosperous, while 
others are seemingly trapped in a cycle of violence and poverty, without any clear perspective 
of real improvement. 
The main argument that forms the essence of this publication emphasizes the 
importance of inclusive economic institutions as provided by the state. The idea of an 
inclusive economic institution encompasses several aspects: an unbiased rule of law; the 
guarantee of secure private property; and a provision of public services that helps people to 
exchange and enter the business field. All these factors help to stimulate people to participate 
in economic activities.78 And crucially, they are provided by the state: “the state is thus 
inexorably intertwined with economic institutions, as the enforcer of law and order, private 
property, and contracts, and often as a key provider of public services. Inclusive economic 
institutions need and use the state.”79  
In order for this provision to take place successfully, the state needs to be inclusive in 
itself as well though. In practice, this means that the political institutions should be 
sufficiently centralized and pluralistic in order to be inclusive. This in turn fosters economic 
growth as political stability and inclusiveness create an attractive business climate through 
inclusive economic institutions. This same effect also works the other way around; extractive 
economic institutions are almost always (with some exceptions such as South Korea) 
accompanied by extractive political institutions.80  
The vicious circle coming out of this crucial difference between extractive and 
inclusive institutions is the core idea that returns in every argument throughout the book. 
Basically, extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, as they 
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transfer power and wealth toward the elite. These extractive institutions then become self-
enforcing and help the elite to remain in power. This process forms a vicious circle that 
cannot be broken so easily. 81  Even worse, this circle can lead to even more problems 
throughout time, as rulers lacking any real system of checks and balances will raise the stakes 
to remain in power.82 To quote Acemoglu and Robinson: “extractive institutions then not only 
pave the way for the next regime, which will be even more extractive, but they also engender 
continuous infighting and civil wars. These civil wars then cause more human suffering and 
also destroy even what little state centralization these societies have achieved.”83 At the same 
time, the new rulers that come out of these wars are also unlikely to make any real changes to 
the institutional structure, as they most likely wish to preserve their own authority as well.84 
All in all, one can then conclude that history, through the critical moments in which 
institutions became inclusive or extractive, has been key in determining which countries are 
rich now.  
In many cases, colonization has been a large contributor to this vicious circle. That is, 
European colonizers created extractive institutions that were later on maintained by local 
elites, who were happy to make use of them for their own profit. To quote Acemoglu and 
Robinson: “the profitability of European colonial empires was often built on the destruction of 
independent polities and indigenous economies around the world, or on the creation of 
extractive institutions essentially from the ground up (…).” 85  These extractive political 
institutions then gave many of the rulers the power to maintain extractive economic 
institutions, which was also in their interest. This power thus provided an incentive to 
maintain extractive political institutions. It is therefore no coincidence that many of these 
states have never really managed to establish efficient and fair institutions in their territories 
after independence, given that their rulers were mainly focused on enlarging their own profits 
and any proper system of checks and balances was (and often still is) lacking. 
Examples of several countries are presented to support this theory. For instance, the 
imposition of extractive, non-fitting institutions in Egypt led to a basic structure of society 
that never changed throughout a period with various rulers. According to the authors, Egypt 
remained poor as a consequence of these developments.86 Another case is Colombia, which is 
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considered partially democratic, yet fails to provide basic services. This is also a type of a 
vicious circle in which politicians are only interested in running the “functional parts of 
society.” Two factors underlie this vicious circle: first of all, the lack of government 
centralization and weak presence in parts of the country. This is in itself the consequence of 
the fact that political institutions do not generate incentives for politicians to provide public 
services and law and order. Furthermore, these politicians are not constrained enough to 
prevent them from making corrupt deals with illicit groups.87  
These issues certainly also apply to the Sahel region and Mali. According to the 
authors, “the early stages of the process of colonization are a critical juncture for most 
societies, a crucial period during which events that will have important long-term 
consequences for their economic and political development transpire.”88 One can interpret this 
development in the case of Mali by for instance looking at the imposition of the centralized 
state by the French that severely hurt the northern Malian economy, which largely existed out 
of informal and transnational trade. At the same time, the state did not provide much extra 
practical authority in terms of military presence or proper policing.89 Furthermore, Acemoglu 
and Robinson also stress that “in most of Africa, independence (…) recreated existing 
extractive institutions.”90 Indeed, it will become clear that the foundation of many of the 
current problems of the Malian institutions can be traced back to the period around the French 
rule and decolonization.  
Breaking this cycle is very difficult. The problem is that almost all power takeovers 
will preserve the current extractive situation, as the lack of checks and balances would allow 
the new rulers to maintain existing structures in order to enrich themselves, just like the 
previous rulers. In that way, political institutions will remain extractive.91 This reasoning can 
explain the continuity of extractive institutions in many states since decolonization. It also 
leads Acemoglu and Robinson to conclude that foreign aid is very inefficient if it does not 
seriously attempt to transform exclusive institutions into inclusive ones.92 
Could one think of any possible solutions for this quite enduring problem? For the 
authors, the answer can be found in the concept of the critical juncture. According to them, 
fighting corruption, an event, or preexisting inclusive elements in institutions can all provide 
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the necessary element to break the cycle by transforming extractive institutions into inclusive 
ones.93 Critical junctures could thus break the cycle and as a result change the course of 
history. However, these junctures will all be incredibly difficult to establish as well.  
2.1.3 Douglas North’s Approach to Institutional Change 
As a comparison to Acemoglu and Robinson’s ideas, another important theory regarding 
institutions and institutional change also needs to be discussed. Crucially, Douglas North’s 
analysis of this topic also focuses on the importance of the problem of inefficient institutions 
and the reasons why they remain in place. Equally, for North, the idea of increasing returns 
provides the core incentive to maintain a certain structure. 94 Essentially, this theory therefore 
also deals with the issue of path dependence.  
To start with the core idea in this discussion of the theory: institutions have been 
founded with the main goal of providing stability. That is, institutions determine the structure 
for exchange that in turn determines the cost of transaction and transformation. Furthermore, 
they should for instance protect property rights, in that way stimulating incentives to 
innovate.95 The result is a reduction in the uncertainties involved in human interaction. This 
interaction is originally largely based upon the game theory’s perception of human beings as 
rational actors. However, North criticizes this approach as it does not take into account certain 
“flaws” of human choice-making, such as incomplete information-processing and ideological 
convictions. The existence of these institutions, which cannot be seen as efficient in any way 
though, therefore also needs to be taken into account.96  
While these institutions were thus founded to provide more stability, they have 
actually just as often become a source of instability. To paraphrase Douglas North when 
discussing the role of the institutional structure throughout history: “in this environment the 
role of the state was at best ambiguous, because the state was as often an increasing source of 
insecurity and higher transaction costs as it was protector and enforcer of property rights.”97 
Nowadays, one could still say that some institutions induce economic growth, while others are 
a cause for the lack of progress in Third World countries, as the lack of property rights 
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provides no incentive to invest, given the often redistributive nature instead of a productive 
one.98  
However, before being able to conclude more about these institutions, one needs to be 
aware of the difference between formal and informal institutions or ‘constraints’. Essentially, 
informal constraints entail codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and conventions.99 Formal 
constraints on the other hand include political and judicial rules (constitutions and laws), 
economic rules, and contracts.100 The final outcome is then determined by a combination of 
both of these institutional constraints. Therefore, one needs to take both formal and informal 
institutions into account when looking at the performance of a state or economy.101 
Within the complex informal institutions, it is especially important to take the role of 
culture into account. Culture, defined by North as “the transmission (…) of knowledge, values 
and other factors that influence behavior”, 102  is mainly important because it “provides a 
language-based conceptual framework for encoding and interpreting the information that the 
senses are presenting to the brain.”103 The reasoning as a result of this culture has throughout 
history proven to make up a large part of the informal constraints. In that sense, one can see 
culture as a complex network of norms and informal rules that can provide a sense of order 
precisely because they are all so interconnected and related to other important societal 
aspects.  
Cultural influences are particularly important because they are so embedded in broader 
society. Two main ways can be identified in which culture affects the choices made. In the 
short run, it defines how individuals process and use information, which in turn determines 
how informal constraints are specified. 104  In the long run, the cultural processing of 
information “plays an important role in the incremental way by which institutions evolve and 
hence is a source of path dependence.”105 Thus, culture only changes very gradually, has a 
high chance of surviving for a long time, and sets in motion a process of increasing returns 
that will make any radical changes difficult to accomplish. As a result of these effects, a 
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culture cannot simply be changed in a radical way. Therefore, the cultural aspects of a society 
usually remain the same, even after drastic changes to the formal institutions.106 
Institutional change is therefore a largely gradual process that can include tensions 
between formal and informal institutions. Change mainly occurs if people perceive changes in 
the value of an agreement or if their ideas alter. 107  This can lead to the rise of policy 
entrepreneurs; people who strive to change the existing situation into their advantage.108 
However, due to the incremental nature of change to the informal institutions and their deep 
roots in local culture, “a change in formal rules or their enforcement will result in a 
disequilibrium situation, because what makes up a stable choice theoretic context is the total 
package of formal and informal constraints and enforcement aspects.”109 As a result, more 
radical changes to the formal institutional structure will most of the time result in an ongoing 
tension between informal constraints and the new formal rules, since the two are at that 
moment inconsistent with each other.110  
The process of institutional change is also a very complex one because of the differing 
circumstances. Inevitably, this wide variety of circumstances means that the imposition of a 
common formal institutional framework in different states will still lead to different outcomes 
in each of these places. As North says: “Although the rules are the same, the enforcement 
mechanisms, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of behavior, and the subjective models 
of the actors are not.”111 Thus, the consequences of the imposition of a familiar framework, as 
for instance in the case of Western state models, in a new place can never truly be predicted 
according to this theory.  
Other authors criticize the Western focus on formal institutions that according to them 
fails to properly take into account the local informal institutions as well. For instance, Hüsken 
and Klute discuss the Western view of African institutions as part of an article about the 
concept of heterarchy. This concept entails a very broad definition of governance systems, in 
which political orders of many different kinds can still be seen as a particular governmental 
system. It is presented as a reaction to the narrower Western definition, in which the results of 
institutions are observed to (too) strict criteria.112 Or as Hüsken and Klute say: “The African 
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state is often represented against the background of the Weberian state, and adjectives 
qualifying it are hence mostly negative.”113 Their argument can then in essence be regarded as 
a plea for more attention for local groups and communities as part of the institutions, as a 
healthy addition to the focus on the standard mold of state institutions confirming to the 
Western model.114  
These complications have throughout history usually caused the inefficiency of many 
institutions, that has often not been thoroughly corrected afterwards due to path dependence. 
After all, institutions were often designed imperfectly from the start, as “the experience of the 
agents and the ideologies of the actors do not combine to lead to efficient outcomes.”115 For 
North, the concept of path dependence, and more specifically increasing returns, has 
prevented many institutions from being improved as lessons were learned. That is, the concept 
of increasing return will largely reduce the chances that these already inefficient institutions 
will be thoroughly adapted as time passes, since the fear of incurring large losses will severely 
limit the changes that policymakers are willing to pass through.116 In Mali, one can also 
witness this in the case of the imposition of formal colonial institutions that did not match the 
local culture, yet remained in place later on as they served in the interest of those controlling 
this system.  
At the same time, one needs to bear in mind that possibilities to escape this ‘path’ still 
exist. Namely, “path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link 
decision making through time. It is not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts 
the future.”117 Thus, one can always find choices that provide real alternatives. The main 
problem is that increasing returns prevent the change of course, as certain actors such as 
organizations or interest groups who have a stake in the existing constraints will thus attempt 
to maintain these as they are.118 Or in the words of North: “once a development path is set on 
a particular course, the network externalities, the learning process of organizations, and the 
historically derived subjective modeling of the issues reinforce the course.”119 Yet that does 
not rule out the possibility that this process of reinforcement can be changed. 
The possibility of changing or reversing the trajectory that characterizes path 
dependency is something that both authors on this theory seem to agree upon. That is, 
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Acemoglu and Robinson agree with the idea that relatively unimportant events can in theory 
still be reversed. According to them, “small institutional differences that play a crucial role 
during critical junctures are by their nature ephemeral.” 120  Therefore, they can also be 
reversed again; this is for instance illustrated by the case of Venice, which switched from 
inclusive to extractive institutions.121 This train of thought seems to support the ideas as 
outlined by North about the incremental and gradual nature of the path that leads to a certain 
outcome, albeit without the focus on the crucial role of events that the former authors have 
described as ‘critical junctures’. Thus, the trajectory in which increasing returns make the 
choice for a more radial alternative more and more unlikely can still be broken or reversed, 
although this is a highly unlikely development.  
2.1.4 Institutional Theory and Process Tracing in Mali 
How does this theoretical framework help to guide the research into the causes of the Malian 
problems and the developments related to the EU’s actions in Mali? Answering this question 
is probably one of the most difficult parts of this dissertation, and a very important one as it 
will strongly influence the analysis of the situation in Mali. It is very important to consider 
different theories, since the theory will enable a closer examination of the sequence of events 
in the case study of Mali, and in that way will also strengthen the train of thought that will 
form the basis of the analysis.122  
Despite their similarities in core reasoning, these two institutional theories do 
significantly differ in the focal point of their analyses. First, it is important to be aware of the 
fact that both theories do emphasize the role of path dependence and increasing returns in the 
institution-related problems that many countries nowadays struggle with. This concept of path 
dependence will thus certainly form the basis of the process tracing that will be performed in 
the next chapter. One should however also note the difference in focus between both theories. 
While Acemoglu and Robinson mainly emphasize the distinction between extractive and 
inclusive institutions as the crucial variable for determining countries’ success, for Douglas 
North the core factor to look into is the potential lack of coherence between formal and 
informal institutions. Both thus focus on different, although probably equally important, 
issues within this process of path dependence.  
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A comparison of these different focal points has led to the conclusion that the 
theoretical framework as outlined by Acemoglu and Robinson will be the main guide in this 
piece of research. This is mainly because of the focus on extractive institutions, which appears 
as a convincing perspective to start with and from which the problems that Mali has been 
struggling with can be looked into in a thorough way. Naturally, this should not cause one to 
underestimate the importance of a focus on informal institutions. However, preliminary 
research showed that informal institutions were relevant in Mali as a first factor in a long 
chain of causes. This core factor was then followed up by reasons that relate to the problem of 
extractive institutions and the vicious cycle that points at the dominance of self-interested 
rulers. Given that the final event could not have taken place without this sequence that seems 
to include all characteristics of path dependence, the extractive institutional aspect appears to 
be most influential in the overall picture. Whether this is true still remains to be seen in the 
analysis.  
The outlined choice also does not mean that Douglas North’s work is now irrelevant 
for this research. It remains very relevant for the overall theoretical discussion, and certainly 
needs to be kept in mind because of its focus on the role of informal institutions in overall 
institutional reform. After all, North’s descriptions of the manner in which institutions provide 
stability, and especially of the conflict between informal institutions (‘the culture’) and formal 
ones, were ground-breaking discoveries that are nowadays just as relevant. Furthermore, his 
focus on the differences between cultures and the effect of these differences on state building 
attempts are also very interesting and particularly useful to test in the context of the EU 
attempts at building institutions in Mali. Therefore, the analysis and conclusions will certainly 
also need to take this theoretical framework into account. This also means critically 
contemplating to what extent North’s work is relevant for the outcomes of the process tracing, 
and vice versa what the conclusions that can be drawn out of this research say about his 
theory.  
 Last, it might be good to emphasize that criticism concerning the theory has been 
taken into account as much as possible. Of course, there are many different theoretical 
frameworks that could be chosen as a ‘map’ instead of this type of the focus on institutional 
path dependence. Yet this theoretical framework is deemed most suitable for the purposes of 
this research, as it enables an investigation on the basis of process tracing about the causes of 
the Malian crisis, which should make clear both the relation between the different root causes 
and the broader applicability of these results in the context of state building in fragile states. 
That being said, important limitations will be outlined in the next part of this chapter, namely 
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the methodology that will underlie the structure of the rest of this paper, and naturally will be 
kept in mind throughout the research.  
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Research Design 
In order to answer the question and hypotheses that were outlined in the introduction, an 
inductive investigation of a single case study will be performed. This type of research can best 
be described as being bottom-up, meaning that empirical facts will lead to more abstract 
theoretical propositions. These can in turn refine existing theories that could then possibly be 
tested and applied to new cases again.123 In this dissertation, these empirical facts will be 
derived from a case study of Mali’s institutional problems, by gathering new information on 
the different events and the causal relationship between them that led to Mali’s current 
problems. Hopefully, new insights will be generated that entail relevant new findings for both 
this concrete policy field and the more general theoretical discussion that was reviewed in the 
previous section.  
The core tool to obtain these empirical facts will be the process tracing approach. 
While many different descriptions of this method exist, one of the most suitable for this paper 
can probably be found in a book by John Gerring. For him, “the hallmark of process tracing 
(…) is that multiple types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single 
inference.”124 In essence, this entails that different pieces of evidence form a causal chain that 
leads to a final outcome.125 Thus, this approach is mainly suitable to trace back the different 
factors that added up to a particular, already known outcome.  
The process tracing approach is a useful option for two important reasons. It is mainly 
crucial to establish causal relationships that move beyond simple correlation. Therefore, it is a 
good tool for clarifying the argument and verifying each stage of a model in complex cases.126 
In other words, it provides the ability to look more into processes and dynamics that drive 
these relationships: the “contextual ‘support factors’ that help produce a causal effect”.127 This 
is exactly what needs to be researched in a thorough manner when determining the core 
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problems in the Malian crisis that state building actors need to address, and the role that 
extractive institutions play in this process.  
Yet next to diving deep into a single case, the use of process tracing can also lead to 
new insights for the broader state building approach and the theoretical field of historical 
institutionalism. After all, this method provides the possibility to investigate possible 
interactions between multiple mechanisms. 128  This could in turn enrich the theory and 
generate new information on the working of these processes for debates regarding future 
policy choices.129 Or to quote Bennett: “by seeking to move beyond statistical associations to 
understanding why these relationships are present, scholars can open new avenues for exciting 
research into substantively important questions about the onset and battlefield dynamics of 
civil wars."130 This seems in line with the argument that the complexity of a process tracing 
approach that focuses on a single case does not mean that it cannot also be generalizable, as is 
provided by Gerring.131 Thus, this research will hopefully not be limited to some findings 
regarding the path dependence of the Malian problems. Instead, its aim is also to generate new 
insights for the broader institutional theory. 
In order to perform this research through process tracing, the events leading up to the 
crisis in Mali in 2012 and 2013, and the following state building efforts by the European 
Union in Mali since then will be used as a case. Mali was selected because of the large 
number of external actors present; this should ensure a sufficient amount of data sources to 
perform a thorough analysis. Furthermore, this country’s situation could also be representative 
for other Sahel states, given that they share similar characteristics: thinly populated countries 
with tribal systems, where poverty, inequality and a lack of economic perspective combined 
with predicted population growth could lead to an increased risk of violence.132,133 Therefore, 
this case study provides a representative image of the various difficulties that the states in this 
region struggle with, and thus also the potential issues that could come up during state 
building efforts by external actors in these other countries.  
The EU was chosen as the external actor to focus on for two reasons. First, it is a 
Western power involved in attempts to create a functioning state that confirms to the Western 
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model.134 Yet next to this, it is particularly affected by Mali in the sense that the predicted 
population growth in combination with long-standing problems could potentially lead to large 
new migration flows from this country and the Sahel region to the European continent.135 
Thus, it would be very interesting to look at the reasoning and effects of efforts to stabilize 
this state for future attempts in other unstable places surrounding Europe.  
In order to use process tracing in a consistent and reliable way, the case study will be 
performed in a generative way, and also make use of four different tests. Generative process 
tracing means that a detailed description will be provided of the causal mechanism that led to 
a certain outcome. In this way, the causal relation will be demonstrated as well. 136 
Furthermore, the research will make use of an outlined strategy in which four different tests 
show the strength of the causal relation. To briefly summarize, one can find four sorts of 
evidence that show a certain causal relationship. The strength of each piece of evidence is 
based on two criteria: the evidence that hold high certainty in its causal relation can be seen as 
necessary since it rules out alternatives and thus confirms a hypothesis, while evidence with a 
high degree of uniqueness might be sufficient in its nature to confirm a hypothesis.137 These 
two factors create four different types of tests that can be passed: the straw-in-the-wind test 
(not necessary nor sufficient); the hoop test (high certainty: necessary but not sufficient), the 
smoking gun test (high uniqueness: sufficient but not necessary); and the doubly decisive test 
(necessary and sufficient).138, 139 The research will establish the sort of test that is passed for 
each event in the chain of sequences, and in that way try to provide a standardized framework 
that confirms the reliability of this evidence in leading up to the Malian crisis as much as 
possible. 
The main source of analysis for this approach will then be the study of a diverse range 
of documents. The information will mainly be derived from government and media reports 
that focus on the situation in Mali since 2012 and the developments that led up to it. For the 
second part, the study will mainly include documents that focus on the EU’s involvement in 
this country and the broader Sahel region. Academic publications regarding the longer-term 
factors, and the more theoretical aspects of state building will be included as well. This 
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technique should provide a good tool for establishing causal mechanisms concerning the 
different factors that led to the current state building approaches, and what have been the 
positive and negative effects of these approaches.140  
The results of this research should first of all provide more specific clarity on the case 
of Mali and its problems. Next to this, however, the outcome will hopefully also answer 
broader questions regarding both the effectiveness of state building efforts by external actors, 
and the reasoning and effects of the European Union’s external policy. Last, these results can 
potentially yield new information concerning the theoretical framework, in particular on the 
role that institutions play within the process of path dependence, and how it can be taken into 
account for future state building efforts.  
2.2.2 Limitations & Their Implications 
As a last part of the methodological discussion, it is important to outline the potential 
limitations of this research design, their implications, and what will be done to reduce the 
possible problems caused by these to a minimum. Namely, this research approach is - 
unfortunately - characterized by several limitations. However, as long as one remains aware 
of them and ensures that they are properly addressed, these limitations should not be too 
problematic. 
First, and perhaps most important to take into account will be possible problems in the 
measurement. This problem can take several forms. It can for instance limit the outcomes of 
process tracing. After all, even excellent process tracing can still fail to lead to “wholly 
conclusive evidence”, and in the worst case even to mistaken causal inferences about the 
robustness of the presumed relationship between an independent variable and outcomes.141 
Gerring also mentions the risks of making incorrect assumptions and connects it to the lack of 
formal research design that is inherent to this approach. That is why a strong amount of 
contextual knowledge and a separate evaluation of each observation are so important to 
him.142 Furthermore, it may very well be that information and/or documents on for example 
intended outcomes are not available. In a broader sense, this applies to the general outcomes 
of state building efforts, as perception and perspective upon a better future also play a large 
role here. Given their subjectivity, these concepts are difficult to trace back to certain policies.  
Second, the focus on the (indirect) role of institutional factors means that the (more 
direct) role of actors and short-term events will be taken into account in a limited way. The 
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process tracing in this research is after all guided by an institutional theoretical framework. 
This presumes that there is a difference between the deeper institutional environment and 
organizations and actors who are acting with a certain strategy in mind.143 The possibility that 
one might neglect the importance of structural factors that could condition which mechanisms 
are present and the magnitude of their effects, is also mentioned by Bennet and Checkel.144 In 
order to ensure that this difference is taken into account as much as possible, the institutional 
factors in Mali are the main topic of this research. However, the role that actors such as the 
government played in the short term will still be part of the approach when it is deemed a 
crucial factor in the overall sequence of events. 
Last, several minor concerns should be addressed here as well. One of these issues is 
the fact that, in the interest of time and due to practical and security constraints, the main 
focus of this research lies on literature study, without thorough field research, as is for 
instance recommended by Bennett and Checkel.145 Furthermore, one should be aware that the 
discussion concerns an ongoing case. As a result, some effects are probably unknown yet, and 
involved officials might be unwilling to discuss certain issues. Finally, the proposed theory 
has been criticized for not taking the role of migration into account, even though this factor is 
likely to play an important role in this case study.146  
While they need to be taken into account properly, these potential problems should not 
stop one from performing research on issues that are not as easily measurable as some others. 
In the end, a thorough application of this approach should offer a relatively complete and 
useful image that also takes more subjective factors such as perception into account in the 
overall chain of developments. Process tracing is very important in this sense to unravel the 
scenario and help filter out possible alternative causes to an event. Naturally, everything will 
be done to ensure that potentially generalizable claims have been subject to a thorough 
analysis, through for example multiple measurement sources for each factor, and transparency 
about the selection mechanisms out of which these different factors came forward.147  
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3. Process Tracing Mali’s Institutional Developments 
Which events and factors led to the 2012 uprising and the 2013 intervention? And can these 
be seen to clearly connect to each other, being exemplary of the idea of path-dependence? 
These are important questions that should be answered in this chapter. In order to do so, the 
main problems and their respective influences on the 2012 crisis will be discussed by making 
use of a process tracing analysis. In this way, not only should the individual background of 
each factor become more clear, but the influence of each one of these factors on another will 
also be included. In the end, this could provide a useful overview of the sequence of events 
leading up to the “disaster year” of 2012, and to what extent one could say that they form a 
chain of events that made a particular outcome more and more likely due to the idea of 
increasing returns.  
Before looking at these problems however, one should remember that the international 
community for a long period regarded Mali as a positive case that could serve as an example 
for other democratizing states in Africa. Until 2012, many donors, including the Netherlands 
and Germany, highlighted the democratic elections, the end of the civil war of 1996, and the 
growth of the Malian economy as indicators of this success.148 According to Freedom House, 
media were among the most free in Africa, and elections were regarded to be fair in 
general.149 The Economist Intelligence Index for a while also classified Mali as a “flawed 
democracy;” one of the few of this kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. 150  Freedom House still 
classifies Mali as “partly free”, a relatively decent score when compared to large parts of 
Africa or Asia.151  
This positive image was suddenly shattered in 2012. Yet at a deeper level, several 
problems had been disturbing Malian society for a long time already. Or in the words of 
Marco Lankhorst: “the absence of the state, its inability to provide security, and, in particular, 
the malfunctioning of the justice system each contributed to the crisis.”152 While this quote 
refers only to one of the problems that led up to the 2012 crisis, namely the weak state 
institutions, it illustrates well that this crisis did not just drop from the sky. As one will see in 
the remainder of this chapter, some issues were already present in Mali before its 
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independence. This raises the question to what extent the Western-based approach toward the 
development and democracy are applicable in these situations. Hopefully, (part of) an answer 
to that question can be found in a later part of this thesis. 
3.1 Mali’s Tribal Culture 
The area that we now know as Mali consisted of several relatively independent small 
kingdoms in this area before the 16th century.153 As already described, these kingdoms were 
merged into a larger French colony during the 19th century. 154  This new colony, which 
encompassed a larger territory than the current Mali, became known as Sudan before its 
independence. Senegal left this new state soon after independence, leaving Mali as a separate 
state.155 Already shortly after the independence did a first rebellion of Tuareg from the north 
take place.156 Over the years, several factors worsened these first tensions, leading up to the 
2012 uprising.  
As the most ancient, and possibly most complicating factor, Mali’s specific tribal 
culture was already embedded in its society long before this decolonization. When the region 
still existed of small and decentralized kingdoms, the north formed the most important part of 
what would later become Mali, with cities such as Timbuktu and Gao being centers of 
political and economic power.157 Local ethnicity and heritage were the dominant aspects of 
identifying oneself. The fact that imams and chiefs nowadays still form the dominant source 
of authority in these areas reflects this history; often they are more trusted than the relatively 
absent government. 158  Freedom House also mentions the importance of these traditional 
authorities in for example solving judicial disputes in rural areas.159  
Because of this ethnic distinction, multiple groups have never truly adapted a Malian 
“identity.” Traditionally, these factions have always competed with each other regarding 
practical matters such as the use of land.160 Especially the Tuareg identified themselves in this 
way. It appears that before colonialization, customary tribal laws and ways to settle conflicts 
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on boundaries and governance systems in general prevented escalation of the conflicts 
between these groups.161  
The colonization of Africa disrupted a relatively peaceful period. The original  
political structures of the ethnicities were largely destroyed by the European colonial elites, 
who wanted to establish modern, centralized, and European-based administrations.162 In the 
case of Mali, this resulted in a focus on Bamako as the center of the so-to-speak “Malian 
universe.”163 This southern dominance resulted in strong resentment from the Tuareg and 
other northern groups, who never asked to become part of this Western-based state as a new 
institution.164 Indeed, since the imposition of Western-based institutions, this northern sense 
of identity was reason for several revolts for more autonomy or even an independent state.165 
After the independence of Mali, the new postcolonial state never really managed to 
solve these issues around social identity. On the contrary, the general rule became even more 
authoritarian, disadvantaging the northerners in many cases. The main reason for this was the 
fact that the French administrative system was largely maintained by the elite from the 
south.166,167 To them, the tribal population in northern Mali mainly formed an obstacle to the 
creation of a single Malian identity. As a result, the north became gradually marginalized 
while the rulers focused their attention and resources on the ‘useful’ southern part of the 
country.168 After a failed experiment with socialism which almost turned Mali bankrupt, a 
coup in 1968 led to a new dictatorial regime. Yet the northern groups remained marginalized, 
and as a result of this political neglect and the poor economic situation, many of them sought 
refuge in neighboring countries such as Libya and Niger.169  
The improvements that Mali experienced in the 1990s in terms of democratic 
governance did not alter much. After the authoritarian regime disappeared in 1991, a certain 
democratization of Mali began, according to most (Western) sources.170 This has been true in 
the sense that for instance all opposition forces can officially take part in governmental 
coalitions since then. However, in practice the enduring politicization of the administration 
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has ensured the continuation of the abuse of power and corruption by the dominant (southern) 
civil servants. This prevented equal chances for local participants from northern Mali.171 
Because of this underrepresentation at the national level, northern groups have remained 
frustrated about the political system.172  
Nowadays, this unequal division of power and possibilities seems to be continuing. 
The historical focus on a strong executive in practice still leads to a lack of options for true 
compromise. The southern elites, who are dominant in most spheres, take advantage of the 
resulting divided political system. Practical considerations play a role here as well; many 
Tuareg groups are for example simply unable to communicate in the “official” language, 
French.173,174  
The complicated tribal structure in northern Mali can be seen as a strong factor leading 
to the current problems. This tribal culture is often mentioned as one of the reasons for the 
continuing problems with the establishment of a properly functioning state system. For 
instance, Nyirabikali emphasizes that “contributions from traditional and religious leaders to 
the Malian peace process are seen as necessary by all stakeholders (…) due to their role and 
influence in society, particularly in rural areas” because of the trust they enjoy and their 
involvement in many of the tasks in public administration and dispute settlement that they 
carry out.175  
At the same time, one should take into account that there is no such thing as a 
“northern movement”, since the various groups have just as many different political desires 
amongst each other, and do not form a united front. Some ethnic groups in the north have, for 
example, been supportive of the central government in Bamako, albeit this might be more out 
of resentment against the Tuareg than out of actual faith in the Malian rulers.176  
One can conclude that the combination of a general sense of exclusion among northern 
groups and the differences among these northern tribal groups are probably the most dominant 
factor explaining the current situation.177 Yet several other factors also play an important role, 
as will be shown below. 
 
                                                          
171 Van Veen, “Beyond dichotomy,” 18.  
172 “Mali,” The Freedom House, accessed April 22, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2016/mali. 
173 Abbink, Verdeeld Afrika, 106. 
174 Van Veen, “Beyond dichotomy,” 12. 
175 Nyirabikali, “Opportunities and Challenges,” 6. 
176 Chauzal and van Damme, “The roots of Mali’s conflict,” 39. 
177 Guichard, Friendship, descent, and alliance in Africa, 158. 
35 
 
3.2 Trade Routes 
Long-distance trade has been a part of the way of life in northern Mali and the wider region 
for a long time. This mobility created an overarching sense of identity that goes past national 
borders. One of the main reasons is the harsh environment, as a result of which one can never 
be sure of a sufficient harvest.178 Connectivity through general trade and migration routes has 
always been a defining factor in this part of Africa as well.179 As a result, mobility has 
become embedded in the northern Malian culture.180 This has caused an overarching regional 
Sahel identity to emerge. The existence of this identity has prevented the foundation of a 
national Malian sense of statehood among the groups dependent upon these movements, 
which are still based upon the pre-colonial trade routes.181 This dependence upon regional 
movements is also the main reason for the importance of the informal sector in the region.   
Since the 1970s, growing amounts of counterfeit have become more and more 
important. The money that was earned as a result of these counterfeiting operations was 
largely used by local groups to gain more influence and arm themselves.182 A significant part 
of these activities also depends upon forced labor in mines or the agricultural sector, and 
human trafficking to other countries in the region, usually with the purpose of selling these 
people as sex slaves.183  
This trend was strengthened in the 1990s. Since then, Mali’s role as a hub for regional 
migration flows and illegal migration to Europe has increased swiftly.184 Especially since the 
government made a National Pact with several movements in the north and reduced its 
military presence, criminal and radical Islamist groups were able to expand their influence 
very quickly. This increasing dependence on illegal activities further undermined the 
perspectives of a sensible economic recovery in this already troubled region.185 For instance, 
human trafficking is a big issue in the country nowadays; many people who attempt to reach 
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northern Africa or Europe are now subject to human traffickers who use the same old routes 
that were and are used for the movement of arms and drugs as well.186  
The culture of the tribes, and their dependence upon profit made through these routes 
has then led to a particular identity in which distrust against the central government still forms 
an important aspect that is also reflected in the lack of proper state control in large parts of 
central and northern Mali. Add to this the rise of drug trade and the smuggling of humans, 
which has made the control of territory and border crossings more important, as well as the 
territorial aspirations of many rebel groups. These factors led to the increased number of 
insurgencies.187 
3.3 Weak State Institutions 
Several factors have contributed to the fact that the sparsely populated north has always 
experienced a very weak presence of state institutions.188 This is partially the result of the 
tribal loyalty, which has made the already thinly populated region difficult to control for the 
central government. Yet the Sahara region is also simply too big to control. Mali has for 
instance large troubles controlling its border posts. As exemplified by a UN official: “These 
are borders in name only. Geography is the main risk factor, as unchecked frontiers stretch for 
thousands of kilometers.”189 
The main reason for the failure to develop well-functioning institutions in the north is 
the gap between Western-based institutions that were originally imposed by France and the 
reality on the ground. That is, institutions such as Mali’s legal system were basically imported 
from France, without any proper adaptation to the local circumstances in Mali.190 As a result, 
after independence corrupt officials saw an increase in liberty to perform inconsistent policy-
making and take decisions without proper accountability.191 Instead, the main focus was put 
on resourceful places, where the judiciary ruled subjectively, usually in its own favor or that 
of the party that paid most.192 This resulted in even more confusing rules, that locals applied 
only when it suited them personally. The effect of this situation can be seen in the case of the 
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settlement of land conflicts in the Niger Delta: here, people prefer to solve these conflict 
among each other, without any interference of officials from Bamako.193  
Attempts at decentralization by the central government during the 1990s did not solve 
these issues. By providing regional entities with more autonomy, part of the regional 
dissatisfaction could have been taken away. However, general neglect of the northern 
problems seem to have been part of the government’s decentralization policy. While hardly 
providing any basic services in the northern regions anymore under the banner of 
decentralization, the government instead opted for an increased presence of the army. The 
dissatisfaction that this created naturally prevented a solution to the northern quest for more 
autonomy.194 The following quote from a Clingendael report probably says it all: “Bamako’s 
‘military’ approach to the northern issue has been seen as one of the major components of the 
2012 crisis.”195 In fact, the decentralization attempt might even have been counterproductive 
and strengthened the tribal divisions instead, as was partially predicted by Abbink in 2008 in 
his critique on the delegation of tasks to local levels of government, such as municipalities, 
that were at that time already barely functioning.196  
For many Malians, the 2012 crisis was therefore just a new stage in the long-term 
process of continuous state neglect and a lack of public services.197 Bleck and Michelitch 
connect this point to general criticism and a wider theoretical framework concerning the 
Western idea of democracy promotion: geographical control and the performance of basic 
services are crucial for the functioning of a state. Without this, citizens will not even be 
interested in the democratic functioning of their supposed state.198 Judging on interviews done 
by Bleck and Michelitch, Mali was already a failed state before the coup, despite the different 
impression which Western democratic indicators gave. This has resulted in a strong sense of 
apathy towards these official institutions, and a failure to properly participate in the 
democratic process for many.199  
As a result of this weak state control, many inhabitants of northern Mali were forced to 
look for other sources that might provide them with more stability and basic services. One 
might at least conclude that the almost complete absence of proper state institutions in the 
north as a result of the ‘decentralization’ policy has eventually created the opportunity for 
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radical rebel groups such as AQIM to rise to power.200  The rise of foreign involvement 
through for instance Arab-led Islamic schools that promote a strict form of Islam has further 
contributed to this development.201  
3.4 Corruption 
Corruption is a serious problem that has been part of the Malian political system since the 
foundation of the state. That is, the lack of independent control after decolonization rapidly 
enhanced the coming-into-existence of corrupt political elites. As a result of this, corruption 
soon became a widespread issue.202 This trend was further enhanced by the dominance of the 
Malian executive over the state and the widespread abuse of public power, which make it 
almost impossible for the Malian state to properly perform tasks such as the performance of 
impartial judicial services.203 The misuse of aid money and the presumed strong involvement 
of high-ranking officials in the drug trade sector for many Malians meant the final blow to 
any credibility that was still left.204  
As a result of this type of governance behavior, the Malian institutions struggle with a 
legitimacy crisis and its consequences. The trust of Malians in state institutions is generally 
very low, especially among those living in the north.205 This has resulted in continuous low 
voting percentages, in particular in the rural areas. As a consequence, the population is once 
again not properly represented, and corrupt elites do not feel pressured to enhance 
accountability toward the population.206 Furthermore, many Malians do not feel connected to 
“the public good” and try to avoid any taxes or governmental rules as much as possible.207 
Corruption thus further weakens the legitimacy of the institutions, and in this way also the 
usefulness of state presence, as many Malians will feel more threatened than helped by their 
own government.  
3.5 Economic Situation 
The economic situation in (mainly northern) Mali was an additional cause of the conflict in 
2012 crisis. Mali has for a long time been among the poorest and most underdeveloped 
nations in the world: landlocked, with a dry climate that hardly allows for any production of 
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food.208 The officially estimated unemployment rate in 2015 was about 30% (and the real 
unemployment may very well be higher), making the country one of the 20 worst performing 
nations in terms of employment.209 The lack of economic opportunities is even more of a 
problem in the north. Here, the fluctuation in drought can be over 50%, and in some years 
more than 75% of all livestock has passed away.210   
In fact, the severe income inequality between north and south has created a convincing 
reason for dissatisfaction. Despite the development of a democracy roughly complying with a 
part of the Western standards and large amounts of foreign aid, the gap between Bamako, 
which has developed reasonably, and the rest of the country, especially the northern and 
central parts, increased.211 As a result, more than one in three Malians live abroad to earn 
money.212 This unequal division of economic resources has contributed just as much to the 
unrest as the political exclusion discussed before. As Gaasholt notes in a policy brief: “limited 
economic opportunities both heightened the sense of exclusion and reinforced the conditions 
that have produced conflicts.”213  
This inequality is certainly also connected to the sense of political exclusion, as it 
partially derives from the failure to take the local northern culture into account. After all, 
mobility has always been part of the economic situation in the Sahel region to which northern 
Mali belongs. The formal economic institutions (or political ones for that matter) have 
traditionally had a marginal role, and in some cases even worsened the situation, for example 
by limiting movements by the imposition of formal borders.214 This added to the fact that the 
north still had to live off illegal sources, while the south profited more from the distribution of 
governmental resources. These developments enhanced the already existing distinction 
between “northern tribes living off looting” and “the arrogant southerners” even more.215 
This dangerous trend has most likely continued after 2008 as well. The fact that the 
majority of the money designated for the north was spent on security purposes and not on 
improving the economic prospects for this region has strengthened the image that “Bamako” 
was mainly interested in imposing its “external” political regime, but not actually contributing 
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to the region’s wellbeing. 216  As Gaasholt also notes in the same paper: “none of the 
interventions to counter marginalisation have been sufficient to counteract renewed conflict. 
Instead, the latest upheaval has produced more complex tensions among Northern Malians 
than ever before.”217 This problem also encouraged the growth of radical movements such as 
AQIM, as the poor situation of the local population made these organizations’ rhetoric of 
increasing equality and ruling out corruption sound quite attractive.218  
Therefore, more attention should be paid to the solution of this issue. With the 
prospect of a large population increase in the coming decade, this lack of economic 
perspective threatens to become an even bigger problem if the economic situation does not 
improve structurally.219 This is confirmed in interviews by Lankhorst, in which locals point 
out that the huge profits of smugglers and traffickers and their clear visibility in the north, 
make them appear as a tempting alternative for the youth who lack economic perspectives and 
have a very low confidence in the current political rulers.220  
3.6 Divide-and-Rule Tactics 
As a more short-term factor, the government purposefully weakened its own presence, instead 
adopting a strategy of divide-and-rule, using the tribal situation. The core reasoning from the 
side of the government was that the dominance of a coherent northern front had to be 
prevented by dividing the different parties in this region.221 This worked, since northern Mali 
is a mosaic of different groups, identities and interests. As mentioned by Chauzal: “In order to 
achieve long-term stability, Malian authorities would have to deal with different interests and 
sometimes contradictory local demands.”222 The government did just the opposite during the 
last 20 years through its divide-and-rule policy. That is, after previous rebellions of the 
Tuareg in 1992 and 2006, the national government increasingly turned to particular ethnic 
minorities in order to counterbalance other insurgent groups. As a consequence, tribal loyalty 
and inequality among these groups increased and caused more conflict, until the situation in 
the north ran completely out of control and previous peace agreements lost all value.223,224  
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This policy then had two main effects, the first of which was the increased 
“tribalization” of the conflict. Namely, allowing certain groups to make use of the clandestine 
smuggling routes and profit from them, led to fierce competition between different factions 
about these routes and the territory and resources necessary to sustain them. 225  Exactly 
because of this fierce competition, Malians who already defined themselves as part of a tribe 
in a cultural sense extended this identity to the political and economic spheres as well.226 
These groups became more powerful because of the economic independence and the seeming 
legitimation that the use of the trade routes gave to their leaders, while the government 
purposefully undermined its own importance in the region by turning to neglect as a strategy 
to maintain stability. This has made the search for enduring security and a lasting peace 
agreement all the more difficult.227 
The faith that some northerners may have had in the state of Mali was dealt a serious 
blow. The increased competition between different groups that resulted in more inequality and 
the disinterest of Bamako for this situation, made the most affected groups lose their last faith 
in the central government. This government did try to increase its presence in the region 
through winning the loyalty of some of these groups’ elites. However, this approach was not 
aimed at showing average people from this region that the government took them into 
consideration as well. As a result, many people ended up feeling frustrated about their 
traditional elites, whom they regarded as collaborators, and instead joined rebel movements or 
jihadist groups.228 Indeed, many in the north later on indicated that jihadist justice was still 
better than the lawlessness that was the result of the tribal competition.229 In that sense, the 
neglect by the government paved the way for acceptance of jihadist movements as an 
alternative source of law and order.  
3.7 Chaos in Libya 
Although external to Mali, the role of Tuareg workers returning from Libya should certainly 
be considered as well. As was noted before, due to the poor economic situation and structural 
inequality in their home region, many northern Malians moved to surrounding countries for 
(seasonal) labor. One of the most popular states in this context was Libya: a relatively well-
performing economy in the vicinity of Mali. The Libyan leader Gadhafi also paid many 
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Malians for taking part in its Islamic legions to fight in several wars in other countries.230 In 
fact, the Libyan government has for a long time made attempts to influence large parts of 
northern Mali, by supporting rebel movements.231 This all ended with the uprising against 
Gadhafi during the Arab Spring and the brutal civil war that erupted after his death.  These 
have had a disastrous impact on security and the economic situation in Libya. To illustrate: 
exports went down from USD 61 billion in 2012 to USD 11 billion in 2015.232  
The return of many Tuareg from Libya to Mali can be directly related to the 
insurgency that took place in 2012. 233  Most would agree that the return of groups of 
unemployed and frustrated men, most of whom were armed with widely available weapons 
from Libya, to an already very fragile region presented a very toxic recipe. This is noted by 
authors such as Wai, who traces the problems in Mali directly back to the NATO intervention 
in Libya, calling the results of this operation a blowback since it “has destabilised the Sahel 
region and washed it with arms and armaments that Tuareg rebels and their Islamist allies 
would use to wage the latest phase of their rebellion in Mali (…)”.234  
The new role of Libya as a regional hub for smuggling and migration should be 
considered as another relevant side effect strongly influencing Mali. Since the eruption of the 
civil war in Libya, it has become a playground for criminal smuggling and human trafficking 
networks. Especially migration from Libya to the EU has increased drastically during the past 
few years.235 The rise of these illicit sectors has most likely also stimulated the presence of 
insurgent groups in northern Mali, who now have another source of income via the illegal 
circuits in Libya. This continuing dependence upon illegal activities as a source of income 
seems to make a durable peace agreement in Mali more difficult to achieve, as these groups 
will be hesitant to give up their activities.  
3.8 The Coup 
One last factor should be discussed as part of this overview: the low morale among 
government troops led to the ousting of the ruling president Touré. That is, many frustrated 
soldiers refused to sacrifice themselves in order to stop the rebel insurgency for several 
reasons. First, the government’s continuous lack of attention for the north led to a split 
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identity. Not only did this policy frustrate many northerners; it also caused many southern 
Malians to consider the uprising in this northern region of ‘bandits’ an event not worth risking 
their lives for.236 Next to this, corruption and nepotism had undermined both the legitimacy 
and the capabilities of many state institutions, specifically within the army. As a result, the 
military was unable to properly cope with the rebels’ offensive, which caused the latter to 
advance at a very quick pace.237  
These many factors mentioned before led in combination to the uprising in 2012 and a 
military coup. Frustrated with the lack of strong performance from the side of the government 
and widespread rumors of corruption and involvement in drug-trade of high-ranking officials, 
and without any real connection to the northern part of the country, Malian soldiers staged a 
coup against their government on March 21, 2012.238 While the international community 
responded negatively, many urban Malians regarded the power takeover by the junta as 
“injecting a much need shock into Mali’s deteriorating democracy.”239 The political chaos that 
followed this coup was gratefully used by the northern rebel groups, who quickly advanced 
south and took over complete provinces such as Timbuktu and Gao within weeks. This 
eventually resulted in competition between different rebel groups, until Islamist movements 
would gain the upper hand and become the driving force behind the rebellion.240  
While the intervention has taken away the most pressing problem, it cannot simply 
address these structural issues. On a positive note, elections were held after the restoration of 
democratic rule in 2015, and judged to be relatively free and fair by international observers.241 
At the same time, several significant practical problems caused hundreds of thousands of 
people, especially in the north, to be unable to vote.242 Weak state institutions were the main 
reason for this, as these led to problems with internally displaced persons and a failure to 
update the census system since 2009. As a result, many people who turned 18 since have not 
been declared eligible to vote yet.243 This represents another failure to address the sense of 
exclusion and dissatisfaction among inhabitants from northern Mali, who were hit hardest by 
these issues. The structural problems therefore still are far from solved.   
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3.9 Path Dependence? 
Looking at the overall picture that this chapter has presented, one finds a sequence of events 
that gradually made the 2012 uprising more and more difficult to avoid. The weakness of the 
state institutions, the strength of the ancient tribal culture, and the geographical location 
among trade routes have, in combination with persistent corruption, caused the government to 
pursue this policy of relative neglect of the north. The result has been political exclusion that 
was strengthened by the structurally poor economic situation in the north. This caused 
conflicts between different factions. The situation escalated even more with the return of 
Tuareg fighters from Libya (who went there in the first place because of the economic 
situation). The poor motivation within the army that caused the coup after the army was dealt 
heavy blows in this conflict can then also be seen as the indirect result of corruption and a 
lack of true motivation to defend the north, as the political exclusion of the north had also 
blocked the idea of a Malian identity that included this thinly populated area. Several 
movements jumped into this sentiment in the north by appealing to the local grievances and 
promoting jihadist thought; this has led directly to the final political crisis that has been 
fracturing Mali since 2012 and eventually caused the international community to intervene.244 
 A closer look at these findings through the process-tracing lens presents a list of 
subsequently influential events that led up to the 2012 crisis, none of which was truly 
dominant though. Most of the factors that were discussed in this chapter would fall in the 
category of the smoking-gun test. The already present tribal culture, the trade routes, the 
economic situation, the divide-and-rule tactics, the Libyan crisis, and the coup all instigated 
the current problems in Mali in their own ways. Yet none of them appears to have been the 
determining factor. In that sense, these factors can all be regarded as sufficient, but not 
necessary for the occurrence of the crisis. There are two exceptions though. First, the presence 
of weak state institutions actually seems to pass the hoop-test on the criterion of being 
necessary but not sufficient: this factor caused the continuous poor economic prospects, the 
weak security situation, and forced the frustrated northern Malians to look for alternative 
sources of legitimacy, yet only contributed to the uprising in an indirect manner. Furthermore, 
corruption seems to pass the weakest test (straw-in-the-wind), as it lowered the legitimacy of 
the government, albeit in a relatively minor way when compared to the other factors. 
In a nutshell, one could say that the imposition of the wrong sort of institutions, that 
did not fit the local culture or the economic situation, has created a vicious circle that 
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enhanced corruption, a strategy of divide-and-rule, and a lack of economic perspective, all of 
which eventually caused the bubble of frustration to burst. Indirectly, the claim can be made 
that geography and tribal culture have prevented a properly functioning Malian state.245 The 
mismatch between formal and informal (i.e. tribal) institutions remains very serious. One 
might conclude that the imposition of colonial institutions that never really fit the local 
situation, and which were never thoroughly altered since independence, was the starting point 
of this sequence of events that eventually led to the uprising. In that sense, one can witness the 
consequences of the failure to turn these initially extractive institutions into inclusive 
institutions later on. The return of frustrated Tuareg from Libya and the military coup were 
then the most recent developments that were part of this “path”. 
 This presents the question what can be done differently in order to bow this sequence 
of events into a direction that will hopefully lead to a brighter future for Mali, and whether the 
current EU policy is actually making progress in this. In order to discuss these questions, this 
paper will continue with an overview of the EU’s policy toward Mali over the past few years, 
how it was formed, and what the main complications were. Afterwards, the content of this 
policy will be compared with the core problems that caused the Malian crisis, based on the 
theory as discussed in the previous chapter. Hopefully, this analysis will provide new insights 
into the extent to which the proposed measures seem to match these problems, and in the 
usefulness of the theory in explaining situations such as the one in Mali. This should in the 
end lead to conclusions regarding Mali that could be useful for understanding other situations 
elsewhere, and be a source of caution for possible future operations in similar countries in the 
Sahel region. 
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4. The EU & Peacebuilding in Mali 
Now that both the theoretical framework and the causes of the Malian crisis have become 
clear, it is time for the last part of the research before the analysis. To start with a brief recap, 
the European Union’s actions in Mali were chosen as a unit of analysis for several reasons. 
First, the already existing migration flows are likely to have an even bigger impact on the 
European continent in the future because of population growth in the Sahel countries. After 
all, European countries have been struggling with migration issues for a long time already.246 
Predictions of large increases in the population of countries such as Mali and neighboring 
North-African states, that might seem far away culturally, but are geographically located very 
close to the Mediterranean EU member states will probably strongly enlarge this problem 
when it is not suitably dealt with.247  
Furthermore, the EU is an interesting actor in this context because of its depiction as a 
normative actor. One of the main ways in which the EU still presents itself is as “a peace 
project that seeks to export its model mainly by the power of attraction.”248 However, grave 
threats in the ‘ring of instability’ or buffer areas surrounding Europe force the Union to think 
critically about this soft-power image, and whether it might need to become more of a hard 
power. 249  Indeed, the issues of stability, poverty, migration, threats to security, and the 
interdependence and complexity of these issues are mentioned as most important reasons 
behind the EU’s external policy for the Sahel region.250 The way in which the EU will choose 
to deal with these problems in the coming years will therefore largely determine how its 
image as a normative power will develop.  
Last, it would be interesting to take a closer look at the EU’s attempts to create a more 
autonomous foreign policy. That is, since the mid-1990s, the EU has made to become a more 
independent military power next to the normative aspect in its external policy.251 Furthermore, 
it has also tried to form a more comprehensive external approach that combines different 
policy areas. However, this attempt still appears to be quite problematic (not in the least place 
because of the diverging interests of the 28 member states and the European institutions).252 
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Yet within this approach, the focus has mainly been on conflict solving and capacity building 
in order to enhance peace.253 This focus makes a closer look into one of the examples of such 
a peacebuilding attempt all the more interesting. 
4.1 European Interventionism: Who Wanted What?  
Before looking into the developments regarding the EU’s peacebuilding approach in Mali, it 
is important to go through the main stakeholders in the process that led to this approach. This 
is the only way through which one can understand the context in which the current mission 
and its goals were formed. Furthermore, it could also be helpful when considering possible 
changes that could be made to this approach so that it fits better with the local institutions and 
problems.  
Essentially, the main outside actor in this region has for the past century been France. 
This can be dated back to the colonization of Mali by the French army in the late 19th 
century.254 After the independence in 1960, strong connections have ensured that the French 
government is still strongly connected to developments in the North African states. Consider 
the concept of the so called ‘power of impact,’ which is present when actors have some ability 
to influence a decision-making process at several stages.255 One actor that certainly seems to 
have had power of impact in this case was France. In general, the Elysée appears to be one of 
the most influential actors in shaping the EU’s different endeavors in (Northern) Africa.256 
Charbonneau and Sears even argue that exactly “because everyone seems to expect that the 
French state will eventually intervene, volunteers and alternative conflict resolution strategies 
are left wanting.”257 
However, during the initial phase of the crisis, France and other Western states made 
attempts to solve the issues through organizations more familiar with the local situation. At 
first, European states mainly relied on the Economic Community of West African States to 
ensure more stability. This seemed to make sense, given that most African states in the region, 
except for Algeria, were more willing to become involved in a regional response to the 
Malian crisis.258 Yet the problem with this strategy was that these organizations were not very 
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satisfied with the delegation of responsibilities to them by the international community, 
without proper financial or material support.259 This made them reluctant to contribute to 
actual military deployment in Mali, while the Malian army itself was also not eager for the 
direct deployment of ECOWAS soldiers in its territory.260  
Other international responses can probably mainly be characterized by “a lack of 
direction, coherence and coordination.”261 The US was not eager to become involved either: 
for a long time the White House opposed a military intervention in Mali as well, instead 
focusing on a political transition in Bamako.262  Only after American citizens were taken 
hostage during an attack by Malian Islamist extremists on an Algerian gas complex did the 
US decide to lend more support to the then already initiated French intervention.263 The UN at 
first did not seem eager to become involved in the full-combat part of the conflict either, and 
therefore supported EU efforts to have most of the fighting done by the Malian army, 
supported by ECOWAS, and later on by the AU.264 However, by the time that a UN Security 
Council resolution had finally created a mandate for the establishment of the AU mission, the 
movements from northern Mali started making quick progress, which left no time to wait for 
the establishment of an international mission.265  
Given this lack of international coordination, France was the actor who had to use a 
contingency plan and establish Operation Serval. The direct goal of this operation was to halt 
the rise of Islamism in southern Mali. However, this limited objective soon turned into a quest 
to retake all of Mali’s territory that was held by rebel forces. 266  Indirectly, two other 
considerations were crucial to the French central staff as well. The first one was the protection 
of economically important minerals located in neighboring Niger. Next to that, the threat of 
extremist Islamism to the broader region and in the longer term also to France and Europe 
was widely used as a justification as well.267 For instance, president Hollande explained his 
decision to put boots on the ground in Mali by emphasizing that “if we let terrorists prosper in 
this part of the African continent, there will be consequences for Europe and France.”268 
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Hereby the French government made good use of the UN Security Council mandate to initiate 
a mission in Mali that was widely supported by the international community.269 
The eventual foundation of the UN mission MINUSMA failed to take away the French 
frustration with the international lack of activity regarding Mali. The new UN mission took 
over the initial mandate of the AU’s AFISMA, which had proven insufficient, on July 1, 
2013.270 However, given the UN’s reluctance to take part in true combat, the mission was 
designed mainly along the lines of a traditional UN peacebuilding mission, putting the focus 
on impartiality and the non-use of force except for the case of self-defense. This meant that 
the French military, albeit reluctantly, would have to stay in Mali for a longer time to take part 
in the more serious combat operations. 271  The inability of other international actors to 
concretely contribute to the solvation of this Malian problem led to great frustration among 
the French.272 On the other hand, the new situation also caused some to regard MINUSMA as 
a simple extension of the French mission.273  
In this context, the EU’s policy choices regarding peacekeeping did not seem 
promising either. While the Union has aimed for a more coherent foreign policy, the majority 
of it specializes in diplomatic action, conflict mediation, and high-end security assistance. 
Regarding actual peacekeeping across the world, the trend seems to be that the EU has 
generally moved toward an indirect role in the peacekeeping world.274 This mainly entails 
building up local security structures and in this way tackling the root causes of instability: the 
relative absence of strong state structures.275 This reluctance to take part in the combat stages 
of these missions is generally characteristic for most of the EU’s member states as well. Tardy 
and Wyss for instance mention the idea of “mission fatigue” when discussing the hesitancy to 
contribute troops to international peacekeeping missions, including for example the UN 
missions, among most EU member states.276  
The reluctance among EU institutions to intervene directly was present in the case of 
Mali as well. The Union sided with the US and avoided a contribution to a peacebuilding 
strategy that could involve the use of violence.277 Instead, it largely aimed to cooperate with 
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and support the AU, so that this organization could perform most of the combat tasks.278 The 
European External Action Service (EEAS) has also tried to convince Algeria to join the fight 
against AQIM in Mali more intensively.279 However, Algeria remained passive for a long 
time after the onset of hostilities in January 2012, with the argument that the previous military 
intervention in Libya was the reason for the current problems in the Sahel regions, and 
therefore another military mission should be avoided.280  
Eventually, operation Serval did achieve the realization that more should be done by 
the EU. During the course of 2012, France had already started pushing more and more for EU 
presence in Mali, especially after a critical evaluation found the Malian army to be incapable 
of performing crucial tasks.281 Certain other EU member states, such as the UK, Spain, and 
Denmark had already been pressing for an EU mission in the Sahel as well.282 Still, France 
became increasingly frustrated after the initiation of Operation Serval because of the limited 
support among other European states for this intervention. The situation at some point caused 
the French government to call integrated European defense effort “illusory.” 283  Yet the 
emphasis on the importance of the intervention and international presence in Mali for the fight 
against extremism in the greater region, but also for the enduring stability in Europe seems to 
have had its effect: the establishment of an EU training mission.284 
The establishment of this so-called EUTM was not a simple decision though. After all, 
setting up such a mission is part of the slow and complex procedure that falls under the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) framework.285 Already in 2012, the EU started 
planning for the EUTM Mali under the banner of this CSDP. 286  Yet the rapid Islamist 
takeover and the subsequent operation Serval quickly reshuffled the political agenda in late 
2012 and early 2013, which led to a rapid expansion of the EUTM plans.287 In the end, the 
EUTM was set up between November 2012 and February 2013, when the mission was 
actually launched. This can be considered a relatively short period of time.288  
The design of the details of the mission once again revealed a split between France and 
most of the other EU member states. The EUTM was set up as a military mission since this 
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made the recruitment of capable personnel easier, and also allowed for a joint EU funding 
mechanism.289Still, despite the rhetorical support, the actual engagement by EU member 
states was limited: three rounds of negotiations were needed to ensure a sufficient amount of 
personnel for the mission. This unwillingness of other member states annoyed France, which 
saw itself forced to contribute more than it planned and wanted to, in order to fill this gap.290 
Most of the lead in the designation of the mission was also taken by France. This was also 
because Mali preferred France as the main point of coordination due to shared history and 
because the Malian army structure – which never changed much since independence – is still 
similar to France’s structures. 291  Therefore, it is broadly accepted that “without French 
leadership, the EU operation would not have happened.”292 
In addition to EUTM, the EU has also established EUCAP Mali. While both missions 
focus on the training of Malian security personnel, the latter’s subjects are the Malian police, 
gendarmerie, and the national guard.293  Furthermore, EUCAP Mali is a civilian mission, 
meaning that its experts advise the Malian authorities and provide training in order to reform 
the country’s security sector, yet will not become involved in combat.294 This mission, which 
has the aim of “reinstating security and lasting peace in Mali,”295 forms part of the broader 
European framework for the Sahel region. One of the main goals as mentioned in its mandate 
is to “support Mali in managing migration flows and border management”296 This specific 
focus underlines that, next to achieving long-term stability of Mali, the EU is specifically 
aiming to reduce migration flows as part of its overarching Sahel strategy.   
Aside from the imposition of these new missions, the EU was already involved in Mali 
through economic and development aid. Due to the strong colonial ties of EU member states 
with Africa, ‘impartial’ development aid to countries on this continent has been part of EU 
policy since the end of the Cold War already.297 However, in hindsight most of these aid 
programs seem to have counterproductive in achieving enduring progress exactly because  of 
their impartiality. According to Weyrey and Boukahrs, in the case of Mali, “international 
stakeholders were all too eager to dispense economic and military aid to Mali while ignoring 
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the state’s links to criminal activity.”298 The same can be said about EU-sponsored programs 
for national conciliation in 2011, which failed to resolve issues and were actually 
counterproductive. 299  The lack of demands for enduring reforms thus seems to have 
contributed to the enduring existence of extractive institutions. These in turn have led to the 
fragile situation in which Mali has been since 2012. 
Since 2012, this support has become less impartial. The EU’s approach for the broader 
Sahel region now explicitly combines developmental and security aspects. The so-called 
‘financial peacebuilding’ is therefore now a core aspect in the context of the EU’s external 
policy.300 An advantage of this is that the leverage that these money flows present can now be 
used more directly, although often in a very ‘rudimentary’ manner. For instance, the EU cut 
back almost all of its developmental funding for Mali in order to contain the military coup in 
2012. 301  Still, it appears very hard to link this type of funding directly to longer-term 
developments in the institutional sector, given the slow pace in which reforms of the 
extractive institutions often take place in other parts of the world as well. 
All in all, the image one gets from this stakeholder analysis is that of one country 
pushing an unwilling Union into more concrete actions than sole financial aid. France can in 
that sense be seen as the largest stakeholder by far. Given the large impact that instability in 
North Africa could have on other EU member states, the unwillingness among many of these 
states to participate remains odd. In any case, one can conclude that the short-term goal of the 
EU’s presence in Mali is to create a more stable environment and an independent authority 
that can govern most of its territory again. In the longer term, good governance and increased 
economic opportunities are issues to strive for as well, yet how these are to be achieved still 
remains hard to answer. 
4.2 Results of the Peace Operation 
Now that the overall interests of the involved actors have been discussed, and the main goals 
of the broader EU peacebuilding policy for Mali are clear, it is time to discuss the actual 
progress and setbacks since the international community became involved in Mali in 2012. 
Or: what went right and wrong?  
Given the quick developments that caused the need for intervention in early 2013, the 
initial objective of the French intervention was relatively straightforward: to restore the 
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authority of the Malian authorities. As a result, this first mission does not really seem to have 
questioned the existing state structures, even when these are among the core reasons for the 
resistance against that same Malian state.302 This does give rise to the dangerous situation in 
which the status quo is enhanced, without critically looking at the need to renew a state’s 
institutions anymore.   
From a military perspective, this mission was quite successful. The more experienced 
and far better equipped French troops, supported by capable intelligence services, had a large 
military advantage over the rebel movements and quickly pushed them out of a large part of 
their territory. 303  Furthermore, they were welcomed by many Malians as liberators; the 
stringent imposition of Sharia law by these movements had quickly led to the alienation of a 
large part of the common population, who were only happy to see these ‘terrorists’ leave 
again.304 
The mission has since then suffered from several problems that have hindered the 
achievement of these objectives though. The official democracy has been restored, enhancing 
the government’s international legitimacy and accelerating the inflow of international donor 
money again.305 However, a significant part of the insurgent fighters seem to have fled to the 
vast desert regions of southern Libya, from where they can still continue a guerilla war. 
Furthermore, the lack of legitimacy that the Malian government suffered from could not 
simply be solved through the use of force. As Boeke and Schuurman phrased it: “‘Serval’s’ 
military success and its contribution to the restoration of democracy in Mali offered a window 
of opportunity to address issues of good governance and initiate reconciliation and peace talks 
between the government and the rebel factions. Unfortunately, at the time of writing it 
appears that this chance has been missed.”306 This also led these authors to conclude that 
simple military power through an intervention is insufficient to provide a long-term solutions 
for these issues.307  
The previous priorities of the international community with regard to these structural 
issues have not given much reason for optimism. That is, international actors and donors have 
for a long time mainly emphasized a narrow definition of ‘good governance’ that complied 
with ideas of economic reforms as outlined by international financial institutions.308 As a 
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result, many of these international actors mainly dealt with the ‘Bamako bubble’ that the 
Malian rulers were part of, in this way creating a situation that did not benefit a large part of 
the Malian population.309 Or to quote Charbonneau and Sears, “excessive enthusiasm for mere 
elections once again ignored the broader domestic governance problems arising from 
‘growing socio-cultural cleavage between urban elites and the rest of the population’ and the 
‘several structural and longstanding threats to democratic consolidation in Mali.’”310 This 
situation support the idea that as long as extractive institutions remain self-sustaining in this 
sense, more efficiency in terms of state success or fair economic growth is hard to achieve.    
At the same time, it would be unreasonable to simply blame Western actors for all of 
these issues. After all, the imposition of a new institutional framework that might work in the 
case of Mali is a large gamble with many risks as well. Furthermore, cultural differences 
between European and Malians certainly caused many problems since 2013 as well. 311 
Despite these differences, the local context was taken into account as much as possible during 
the design of EUTM.312 Furthermore, EUCAP Mali claims that it is not only aiming to restore 
state authority, but also reacted to the need for protection by the entire Malian population by 
focusing on reform of the security sector in the country.313    
Still, events since early 2013 show few signs of true progress. Reconciliation talks 
between the government and some of the insurgent groups have been taking place since 2014. 
This has led to the signing of the Algiers Accords on 15 May 2015. 314 However, violence has 
still erupted frequently after that date as well.315 As was mentioned in the introduction, the 
state’s stability seems to have deteriorated compared to last year, with continuing ethnic 
tensions and spread of violent attacks to other parts of Mali than only the north.316 A row of 
attacks in 2015 have showed how insecure even the Malian capital of Bamako still is.317 
Popular frustration with the government remains, while the international actors have to 
balance between assisting this same government in restoring sovereignty over its territory and 
acting as a mediator between the government and the rebel movements.318 Wing is right when 
she points out that international actors involved in this crisis are aware of these problems, and 
                                                          
309 Ibid, 205. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Galantino and Freire, Managing Crises, 245. 
312 Ibid, 243. 
313 EUCAP Sahel Mali, accessed June 13, 2017, http://eucap-sahel-mali.eu/about_en.html#csdp.  
314 Wing, “French intervention in Mali,” 64. 
315 Ibid, 64.  
316“Mali in 2016,” Fund for Peace, accessed April 4, 2017,  http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/2016-mali.  
317 Wing, “French intervention in Mali,” 66-67. 
318 Sergei Boeke, Transitioning from military interventions to long-term counter-terrorism policy: The Case of 
Mali (2013-2016) (Leiden University, April 2016), 57. 
55 
 
have as a result mainly made immediate stability and security in the area their priority.319 Yet 
the general image leads her to conclude that the lack of progress in both protecting the local 
populations and fighting terrorism in the region are a continuous problem.320  
The lack of coordination between the different international missions active in Mali 
does not help in this context either. At least according to Chauzal, who states that “besides the 
recent efforts undertaken to secure a viable peace agreement, the effectiveness of international 
long-term strategies in the region could also be questioned, especially regarding the large 
number of current initiatives and the lack of coordination between them. (…) Insufficient 
synergy and increasing numbers of interlocutors could undermine clear support for 
stabilisation in Mali, and encourage local divisions over the main priorities to address – 
whether security, economic development or political reform. Mistakes, uncoordinated efforts, 
contradictory messages and blurry priorities have complicated the prospects for dialogue and 
delayed a general consensus on the viable stabilisation of Mali.”321 The different approaches 
and priorities in the broad field of peacebuilding therefore form an extra complication in this 
already challenging process. 
This situation presents many challenges for the longer term. To start with, it is unclear 
how prepared the Malian army and police forces truly are, and if they can conform to the 
timeframes imposed by the European institutions.322 Yet more worryingly is the fact that the 
deeper problems in Malian society of which “the insurgency is one of the symptoms” cannot 
truly be addressed through military means alone.323 Wing reaches this same conclusion, yet 
adds that the international community’s strive for “elections and increased political legitimacy 
in Bamako may offer a possibility for building longterm peace.”324 Unfortunately, in the next 
sentence she also concludes that “the continuing violence after peace accords and the 
formation of even more rebel groups illustrate the lack of progress in both protecting local 
populations and fighting terrorism in the region.”325 This leads her to critically conclude later 
that “the decontextualization and lack of understanding of the roots of the armed rebellion as 
well as increased militarization do little to resolve the underlying problems that lead to 
conflict and a rise in insurgent attacks in the first place.”326  
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The prospects for the success of the peacebuilding approach therefore still seem 
relatively limited. This is mainly due to the continuing focus on those aspects of democracy 
that seem most important according to Western standards, such as elections, instead of on a 
structural change of the extractive institutions or even a critical analysis of the Malian state as 
a problem in itself.327 Charbonneau and Sears also point out that the focus on the creation of a 
shared Malian identity has long “overstated the inclusivity of Mali’s post-authoritarian nation-
state building project.”328 This all relates to the argument of Acemoglu and Robinson that 
extractive institutions need to be drastically altered into inclusive ones in order to achieve 
enduring stability. However, the gradual development into a certain direction through the 
concept of increasing costs makes this transformation after such a long time very complicated. 
As one can conclude from the continuation of the violent situation, true change of extractive 
institutions by external powers is therefore a very difficult thing to achieve.329  
All in all, an overview of the results that were booked since 2013 therefore presents a 
very mixed image. It would be easy to conclude that little progress has been made. However, 
the very complicated circumstances and the seeming awareness among part of the Western 
policymakers about the importance of structural change provide some more credit. What has 
become clear is that the local level needs to be taken into account as a fundamental part of the 
complex process of running a mission in the field.330 This realization seems to be growing 
slowly among EU and UN officials as well. At the same time, they also need to ensure that 
their operations do not become a permanent part of the problem.331 Thus, there is a need for 
more pressure to reform, yet becoming too deeply involved can prevent the Malian authorities 
from operating more independent, and therefore might block any sustainable solution.  
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5. Analysis of the Mismatch Between Policy and Reality 
How do these complications in the peacebuilding approach relate to the previously discussed 
core problems that underlie the current situation in Mali? And can the theory account for this 
relationship? These are the two most important questions that will be discussed in this chapter 
in order to gain a clear image of the causes and consequences of the 2012 crisis in Mali. This 
should also enable one to draw proper conclusions regarding state building problems in this 
context and the applicability of the theory in explaining these issues.  
5.1 Does the EU Policy Match the Situation? 
In a nutshell, the previous research has shown two things. First of all, several events that were 
at first sight relatively autonomous, have influenced each other and formed a chain of 
subsequent factors influencing each other. The cycle created through these events strongly 
enhanced the possibility of rebellion in the north and a military coup against the national 
government in Bamako through the idea of increasing returns. In this process, the mismatch 
between formal and local institutions, and the failure to change the extractive nature of these 
formal institutions have played a crucial role, as they caused both part of the frustration 
among the northerners and influenced other factors that led to even more frustration. The 
international community’s focus on the fulfilment of a standard “checklist” that could classify 
Mali as a partially free democracy does not seem to have led to sufficient attention for the 
more systematic failures of these institutions that certainly seemed democratic on paper. 
Second, this same international community, most prominently France, the UN, the 
AU, and the EU, has since intervened to solve the problems that resulted from this domestic 
frustration through several ways. Although it is hard to make a balanced judgement regarding 
this topic, one could most likely conclude that the long-term peacebuilding goals are far from 
being fulfilled. The direct security at first improved after the French intervention and the 
establishment of MINUSMA. However, terrorist movements continue to threaten the 
country’s stability with frequent attacks, and the EU practices aimed at state building have so 
far lacked most of their desired effects. The continuing frustration with the corrupt 
government and the steady spread of a more radical version of Islam that does not seem 
comprehensible with the traditional values in Mali even seem to enlarge the chances of a 
setback in terms of stability.332 
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One could therefore conclude that the first hypothesis as outlined in the research 
design is correct. The failure to properly take into account the desires or specific 
circumstances of the local populations has led to the foundation of extractive institution. The 
enduring existence of this mismatch has prevented any solution to this problem. The sudden 
rise of radical Islamist movements, which had always lacked any basis in Mali, shows how 
frustrated common Malians were about the failure to change these extractive institutions.333 
Unfortunately, this problem does not seem to have been solved since the intervention: “so far, 
the ruling class in Bamako seems more interested in recapturing the north and restoring an 
intolerable status quo ante than in facilitating national reconciliation, recovery, and 
reconstruction.”334 This limited interest in good governance and Mali’s high corruption rate 
should also be a reason for caution regarding the provision of development funds to these 
rulers.  
The answer to the second hypothesis can also be derived from this discussion. That is, 
these local circumstances also strongly complicate the establishment of a state that conforms 
the Western model. After all, despite all its problems, Mali seemed to conform to Western 
standards of governance before the 2012 uprising. However, this clearly did not translate into 
proper solutions for the actual problems in parts of Mali. More problematic, even basic state 
authority seemed (and seems) to be lacking in the north. External actors also failed to use 
financial pressure or other means to permanently restructure the extractive institutions that 
enhanced corruption and inequality in Mali. These issues can be explained by the Western 
failure to grasp the importance of local institutions and circumstances, which resulted in 
counter-productive attempts to impose a standard Western-based institutional model that in 
reality does not find support on the ground. 
Naturally, an actor that is involved in a more limited way, such as the EU, cannot be 
expected to simply solve these consecutive problems that date back such a long time already. 
Yet given the amount of European money that is spent on these policies, it seems fair to 
critically analyze the focus of the EU policy, and how it affects the potential for a more stable 
Mali. Furthermore, this could hopefully lead to a more effective approach in the near future.  
Luckily, these are not insurmountable issues. The lack of attention for the importance 
of local actors in the Western state model does not exclude core elements from this model 
from being integrated into an overall new theory.335 Charbonneau and Sears also conclude 
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that the best outcome at the moment might be a discussion about the different possible 
institutional models, as they argue that “despite finding legitimacy in ‘liberal peace’ 
discourse, the French intervention also re-energized debates over the limits of liberal 
peacebuilding to frame the types and range of challenges of nation- and statebuilding faced in 
Mali.”336 And for instance those designing EUTM tried to take the local actors more into 
account than was thought at first already. 
However, these predictions and small steps need to go way further in order to truly 
address the problems that were discussed. The overall picture still shows a lack of progress in 
achieving structural change in the foundation of the institutional framework as desired by a 
large part of the Malian population. This is worrying, since “meaningful implementation of 
administrative decentralization will be crucial.”337  Hereby, the differing interpretations of 
concepts remain a strong barrier. For instance, one can witness a strong tension between 
Western governance concepts related to national borders and the flexibility and transnational 
mobility that are part of the northern Malian culture. 338  Governments also use different 
definitions of more concrete issues such as the terrorist threat: while for Paris, the main threat 
in Mali was posed by the Islamist extremists, “when Bamako complains to Paris about the 
threat that ‘terrorists’ pose for the country, it thinks of the Tuareg.”339  
5.2 Theoretical Explanation 
How can the theoretical framework help to explain the phenomena underlying these findings? 
When reviewing the findings of this paper, one can clearly see the development of a vicious 
circle, that becomes harder and harder to break through due to the concept of increasing 
returns as was outlined in the theoretical framework.340 The sequence of events that strongly 
influenced each other and in this way created a cycle that made a particular outcome more and 
more likely, certainly points toward a case of path dependence. However, what still needs to 
be discussed is the importance that two leading authors attach to specific types of institutions 
in sustaining and even enhancing the increasing dependence of such a ‘path’ in the case of 
Mali.  
 The main focus of Acemoglu and Robinson is the role of extractive institutions as 
hindering sustainable economic growth and a healthy political system. When following their 
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train of thought, one could claim that both the early stages of colonization and the period after 
independence formed critical junctures, in which extractive institutions were respectively 
created by the French, and maintained by the new rulers after the creation of the independent 
state of Mali. The mismatch between the existing local circumstances and the newly created 
formal institutions disadvantages the northern Malian economy, yet the ruling elites managed 
these institutions for their own benefits, becoming more and more dependent upon them. This 
has contributed to the endurance of these extractive institutions, and also to the continuous 
simmering of frustration in northern Mali. These institutions have in turn formed the core 
cause of a path in which the national government became increasingly dependent upon poor 
decisions in order to maintain influence in northern Mali. Therefore, it indeed appears that 
international assistance can never truly become efficient as long as it does not manage to 
change exclusive institutions into inclusive ones.  
Douglas North focused specifically on the mismatch between formal and informal 
(local) institutions that can be witnessed all too often. In his perspective, while many 
institutions have been designed to provide stability and lower transaction costs between 
people, they often do the opposite as they take away incentives for people to perform more 
services and lead to more aggressive policies for self-enrichment. Due to this gap between the 
local culture in Mali that was dependent upon interregional tribes and trade, and the official 
institutions that were imposed by the French and later not altered anymore, the Malian 
institutions have become known as counterproductive to the creation of more welfare. Due to 
the increasing returns they generate, it has become increasingly hard to substantially alter the 
nature of these institutions though.  
What does this make clear about the overall attempts to stabilize Mali? When looking 
at the failure to alter the nature of formal institutions that can currently be classified as 
extractive, one could conclude that “Mali is (…) a textbook case study of the failure of 
Western governments and international donors to correctly diagnose the sources of state 
fragility.”341 While this is of course a blunt conclusion to make, it points at the difficulty of 
external actors in altering these extractive institutions because of their increasing returns. This 
theory is then a useful addition as a provider of information about the underlying factors and 
explanations of the persistence of these fragile state institutions. These causes, such as the 
enduring mismatch between institutions and the local reality, and their implications should 
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receive more attention from external actors when trying to establish more effective 
development and peacekeeping missions.  
These findings have implications for the credibility of the theoretical framework. 
Basically, the imposition of formal institutions did not align with the situation on the ground, 
that is the geographical location among trade routes, and the tribal culture. This mismatch 
provided an opportunity for the respective ruling elites, whether French or Malian, to use 
these institutions in their own advantage. In that sense, the mismatch between formal and 
informal institutions can be seen as a reason for the creation and long-term presence of the 
extractive institutions that developed out of this. The different factors that are connected to 
these extractive institutions, such as corruption, state neglect, and the continuous insecurity, 
influenced the creation of a cycle that can be characterized by increasing returns: even with 
the pressure of foreign donors, altering these extractive institutions into inclusive ones became 
an increasingly costly process for those in power. Thus, the core arguments of both North and 
Acemoglu & Robinson contribute to a complete overview of path dependence that can explain 
a large part of the chain of events that took place.  
The influence of human decisions and short-term factors remains a main complication 
for this analysis though. After all, the current situation would not have come into existence 
without the short-term choices made by humans. This makes it very hard to determine which 
factors were truly so influential. Take for instance the statement “the state (and state borders) 
is part of the problem at least as much as it is part of the solution.”342 This represents the 
ambiguity of these issues. Namely, the creation of this state’s boundaries was certainly a 
problematic factor in a long chain of events, yet another large aspect of the problem has been 
the unwillingness of the state’s rulers to thoroughly address the serious issues when it was not 
directly in their favor. Therefore, the policy choices that were made in a more recent 
timeframe need to be equally accounted for. This is something that might always happen 
properly in the case of this theory.   
Yet overall, the theoretical framework appears able to explain the core failures of the 
international peacebuilding attempts by both the EU and other actors quite well. After all, the 
presence of path dependence has been shown in this case. The focus on the role of institutions 
in the process of this path and in the overall problems also made clear that structural changes 
to the nature of these institutions are the only way in which long-term progress can be made. 
This seems in line with the continuing difficulty in solving the problems in Mali. Human 
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policy choices that are often blamed did play an important role here. However, the underlying 
circumstances that were created long before these policy decisions had already caused a cycle 
of increasing returns which made any alternative for better governance a very costly, and thus 
unattractive, sacrifice for the ruling elites. 
5.3 The Short-Term Political Factor 
Before arriving at the conclusion, the last hypothesis still needs to be discussed. While the 
previous discussion has made clear the problems in the field of peace building and their 
underlying causes, the question remains whether changing the entire institutional framework 
in Mali is a direct objective of the EU’s policy. After all, from a political perspective it might 
be more efficient to create short-term stability and ensure the presence of a government with 
whom migration-limiting deals can be made.  
While relatively clear answers could be found to the previous hypotheses, this one 
cannot be answered with certainty. The mandate of EUCAP is a case in which the reduction 
of migration flows has clearly been a core overall goal. Given that this mission is part of 
broader approaches that cover both Mali and other Sahel countries, it is likely that similar 
motives have played a role in other aspects of the EU’s policy toward Mali. However, the lack 
of records that could make clear the true motives underlying these decisions make it hard to 
conclude anything sensible about this. In any case, several motives, including worries 
concerning migration, the long-term stability of North-Africa, and to some extent pressure by 
EU member states to set up a shared mission seem to have formed the reasoning behind the 
peacebuilding policy. The lack of coherence and the dominant role of France in the 
establishment of these missions show that the EU still has a long way to go in this respect.   
Still, the focus of the EU on the problems in the wider region point at the probable 
importance of migration for the development of new policies in the coming years. The EU 
strategy itself mentions that “only a regional and holistic strategy will enable us to make 
progress on any of the specific problems.”343 One of these most pressing issues is the flow of 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean toward Europe. Last year, the EU agreed upon financial 
transactions to Niger in exchange for more stringent measures on migration. According to the 
EU this approach has been successful, as the number of migrant reaching Europe through 
Niger has been reduced drastically.344 Recently, a deal reached between the EU and Sudan 
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that should limit the number of refugees crossing through this country on their way toward 
Europe received strong criticisms from human rights watchers. 345 Given that migration routes 
now seem to have diverted to Mali, chances are high that the prominent position of migration 
on the EU’s political agenda will make Mali and neighboring countries a more important 
topic of EU external policy.346  
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6. Conclusion 
Overall, one can conclude that the different measures as imposed by the European Union form 
a step in the right direction, yet do not seem to truly match the problems that were discussed 
in this paper. This conclusion provides an answer to the research question. In the end, a 
fundamental gap remains between the EU’s policy to strengthen Malian institutions and the 
reality on the ground in northern Mali. This does not entail that the EU’s state building policy 
as such is addressing completely different problems or proposes counterproductive measures. 
However, in the longer run this policy remains relatively inefficient in the sense that the 
institutions that it attempts to strengthen do form part of the problem and therefore need to be 
thoroughly changed. For instance, the causes for the relative state neglect and the poor 
economic situation in the north can be traced back to the deeper mismatch between the 
extractive state institutions (that were never changed after decolonization) and the local 
customs and tribal system that were already present. Thus, the dichotomy between these two 
factors should be treated more critically. After all, as long as the institutions remain 
extractive, the gap will remain and the problematic issues can never really be solved. 
As was already discussed, these findings largely agree with the outlined hypotheses. 
The expectations regarding the lack of consultation of the local population, and the mismatch 
between the cultural circumstances and the Western state model have turned out to be true. 
The last hypothesis regarding the motives that underlie the EU’s involvement in Mali should 
be revised though. After all, the expectation that migration played an important role in the 
overall determination of this policy did most likely turn out to be partially true. However, the 
discussion in this paper is not sufficient to conclude this with certainty. Therefore, it would be 
better to lower this expectation to a more general prediction that migration has been an 
additional factor that was considered next to the foundation of a stable state, yet cannot 
directly be considered the most dominant incentive  
This leaves open the question of how these findings are relevant for both the broader 
field of peacebuilding, and for the theoretical discussion concerning this topic. To start with 
the first issue, other research and reports, such as for instance Tardy and Wyss, already 
concluded that the factors that underlie the problems in Mali are “by no means exceptional to 
Mali and can be found in many African countries.”347 These authors continue the discussion 
by pointing out that “the ‘crisis in Mali’ might be better described as an ‘African crisis in 
Mali’. Hence there is a need to learn lessons in order to improve mechanisms at the sub-
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regional, continental and international levels for the prevention, management and resolution 
of conflict.”348 These words seem in line with the reason why Mali was selected as a case 
study: the circumstances in this country, such as the tribal culture, the fragile state institutions, 
and the continuous neglect of some regions, although particular, are in general applicable to 
the broader Sahel region, and to some extent also to other fragile states. Hopefully, these 
factors will then be taken into account for the development of state building missions in other 
places.  
These findings have also confirmed the importance of the theoretical focus on path 
dependence. The initial mismatch between local circumstances and newly founded formal 
institutions, as well as the concept of increasing returns turned out to be good explanatory 
variables for the continuing problems and the difficulties in successfully changing these 
institutions. Therefore, the outcomes of this research support the focus on path dependence as 
outlined by Acemoglu & Robinson and by North. This also entails that the theoretical focus 
on institutional developments is potentially useful for future peacebuilding approaches in 
similar countries, given that problems related to extractive institutions and the difficulty of 
establishing Western-based institutional models exist in many other places as well. At the 
same time, localized approaches remain essential due to the differing factors that make up the 
path dependent chain of events in different countries.  
6.1 Recommendations & Options for Future Research 
What does this framework say about the options that external actors have to achieve these 
structural changes, and what possible research could be done for more concrete 
recommendations to address these gaps? This is a very difficult situation, since international 
missions can mainly aim for short-term solutions, while true institutional change would have 
to come from the local population and rulers. Still, the findings derived from the literature do 
provide some guidance that could be useful for the set-up of future peacebuilding missions in 
a similar context.  
As a general strategy, transformation should become the main goal instead of conflict 
resolution. That is, international missions should help to create a new critical juncture during 
which extractive institutions can finally be transformed into inclusive ones. This should take 
place by taking the local desires and institutions better into account in order to create a more 
sufficient system of checks and balances. Yet it is important to note that decentralization is 
not automatically sufficient to achieve more checks and balances; as was discussed, this 
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policy has mainly benefitted corrupt officials at the local level instead of the actual citizens. 
An important aspect of the renewed policy would be a tougher policy to counter corruption in 
the government rather than partnering with the government too unconditionally.349 Possible 
other options could be an increase in the representation of existing institutions, or the 
inclusion of traditional leaders in a more formalized framework.350  
One concrete reform would be to integrate different policy fields in order to establish a 
more inclusive policy. One could think of the integration of ends (combining prevention, 
peacekeeping, and development), among actors (more coordination between the EU and 
external organizations), and the integration of means (a combination of civilian and military 
approaches).351 This should create an approach that addresses both short-term factors such as 
economic perspective, infrastructure, and security, yet will also pay more attention to the 
issues of culture and political representation. After all, “since independence in 1960, Mali’s 
precarious national unity has been built upon conflict and distrust between communities.”352 
Therefore, a thorough analysis of the patronage networks and the influential tribal cultures is 
necessary, after which the composition of the ruling elite should become more representative 
of the different cultural groups in Mali.353 ,354  This increasingly integral approach should 
contribute to a more balanced situation in which government and local circumstances match 
better. Eventually, such an improvement should be established theoretically, as “the result 
over time tends to be a restructuring of the overall constraints – in both directions- to produce 
a new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary.”355  
Furthermore, these peacebuilding missions should focus on a broader area than just 
Mali. Wehrey for instance stresses that conflicts and crises in the Sahel region usually have 
both transnational origins and consequences, yet “Western governments and international 
donors have (…)  largely ignored that insecurity is a product not just of internal factors but of 
external ones as well.”356 Therefore, the international community should do more to promote 
regional cooperation and involve neighboring states in military operations and peacebuilding 
missions. The improvement of the communication between different countries’ border patrols 
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and better cooperation with local communities in this region are positive examples of this 
realization in the case of Mali.357 
While these recommendations might provide a first stepping stone for a change in 
peacebuilding strategy, more research into many factors is certainly necessary. The reasoning 
behind the EU policy, such the different wishes of member states, would be a relevant topic 
for further research. This would be intense in terms of time and resources, since interviews are 
probably the only sufficient tool to achieve enough information on this issue. Still, it would 
surely be important to learn more about the extent to which issues such as migration influence 
the long-term state building policy in the Sahel region. Furthermore, a better understanding of 
the psychology of the different insurgent movements and their underlying rationale could 
potentially contribute to a better analysis of the possibility of stimulating national conciliation, 
and also provide useful insights for the broader fields of peacebuilding and conflict studies. 
Thus, plenty of research remains to be done before these problems will truly be solved.  
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Appendix A: Process Tracing Scheme 
 
Subsequent Relations Between These Factors: 
1. Gap between the institutional 
structure and the local culture. 
2. Mutual relationship between 
corrupt officials and the lack of 
legitimacy of state institutions. 
3. Lack of military motivation to 
protect corrupt officials. 
4. Weak sense of identity & internal 
fights. 
5. Dependence upon illicit forms of 
trade as a main source of income. 
6. Government looks for alternative 
manners to impose control. 
7. Strong sense of neglect. 
8. Loss of faith in government.  
9. Especially frustration among 
already impoverished Tuareg. 
10. Increased conflicts between 
different groups. 
11. Increasing sense of neglect. 
12. Lack of future perspective.  
13. Frustration with the ruling elite. 
14. Weakened the army in general and 
especially its morale. 
15. Lack of economic perspective in 
Mali. 
16. Presence of many young men in 
Libya, most of them learning how 
to deal with the omnipresent 
weapons. 
17. Increasingly dangerous situation in 
Libya. 
18. Return of many frustrated and 
armed young men to troubled 
northern Mali. 
19. Reduced legitimacy. 
 
 
